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Abstract : 
This thesis deals with the problems of designing display systems 
for process plants. We state the reasons why it is important to 
discuss information systems for operators in a control room, es-
pecially in view of the enormous amount of information available 
in computer-based supervision systems. The state of the art is 
discussed: How are supervision systems designed today and 
why? Which strategies are used? What kind of research is going 
on? Four different plants and their display systems, designed by 
the author, are described and discussed. Next we outline different 
methods for eliciting knowledge of a plant, particularly the risks, 
which is necessary information for the display designer. A chap-
ter presents an overview of the various types of operation refer-
ences: constitutive equations, set points, design parameters, com-
ponent characteristics etc., and their validity in different situa-
tions. On the basis of her experience with the design of display 
systems; with risk analysis methods and from 8 years, as an engi-
neer-on-shift at a research reactor, the author developed a method 
to elicit necessary information to the operator. The method, a 
combination of a Goal-Tree and a Fault-Tree, is described in 
some detail. Finally we address the problem of where to put the 
dot and the lines: when all information is ‘on the table’, how 
should it be presented most adequately. Included, as an appendix 
is a paper concerning the analysis of maintenance reports and 
visualization of their information. The purpose was to develop a 
software tool for maintenance supervision of components in a 
nuclear power plant. 
Resume Denne afhandling drejer sig om problemerne med de-
sign af display systemer til procesanlæg. På grund af de store 
mængder af information der er til rådighed med computer-
baserede systemer er det nødvendigt at fastlægge hvilke informa-
tioner operatøren behøver for kunne udføre sit job. State of the art 
bliver også diskuteret: Hvordan designes overvågningssystemer i 
dag? Hvilke strategier bruges til designet? Hvad foregår der på 
forskningsområdet?  Fire forskellige display-systemer, som for-
fatteren har udviklet, beskrives og diskuteres. Dernæst beskrives 
fra hvilke kilder designeren kan få oplysninger om anlægget. Der 
lægges vægt på hvilke risici der kan forekomme med anlægget. 
Et kapitel beskriver hvilke grænseværdier der kan benyttes ved 
display design, såsom konstitutive ligninger, setpunkter, kompo-
nentkarakteristikker, design parametre, samt deres validitet i for-
skellige situationer. På baggrund af forfatterens erfaring som 
designer af display systemer, som forsker inden for risikoanalyse 
og ud fra 8 års erfaring som driftsingeniør på en forsøgsreaktor, 
har hun udviklet en metodik til at fastlægge hvilke informationer 
en operatør skal have for at kunne overvåge et anlæg på en sikker 
måde. Metoden, der bygger på en kombination af et goal-træ og 
et fejl-træ beskrives i detaljer. Til sidst beskrives hvordan de 
nødvendige informationer kan analyseres, og hvordan de bedst 
præsenteres på skærmen. En artikel om informationssystemer til 
vedligeholdsplanlæggere er medtaget som et appendix. Formålet 
med dette arbejde var at udvikle et software program for vedlige-
holdsovervågning på nukleare anlæg. 
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DK-4000 Roskilde 
Denmark 
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bibl@risoe.dk
Fax +45 46774013 
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Preface 
This thesis is the result of a PhD study performed at Risø National Laboratory 
and the Technical University of Denmark. The study forms a part of the re-
search carried out in the OECD Halden Reactor Project (HRP) in Norway and 
in the Nordic Nuclear Safety (NKS) Projects. For the authors part of the re-
search, the HRP concerns development of display systems to operator in nuclear 
power plants and the NKS, information systems for maintenance planners. Dur-
ing earlier project work within HRP and NKS I found there was a gap between 
research on the design of display systems and practical experience and knowl-
edge. The designers, often operators with practical experience and knowledge 
on the other hand do not know about the research going on in the field. It is this 
gap I want to bridge with the thesis. 
 There are two main subjects to treat: What to present to the operator, and how 
to present it. These are also the main subjects for the thesis. 
The displays developed for nuclear power plants have been tested on full-
scale simulators at the Halden Reactor Project. A software tool for maintenance 
supervision has been further developed at Risø and is now installed at the cen-
tral office in Stockholm, where all maintenance and failure reports for the Nor-
dic nuclear reactors are collected: a tool to which all the involved power plants 
have access.  
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1. Introduction   
To operate a process plant one must be familiar not only with the plant and the 
process but also with the safety aspects of the operation. Particularly in abnor-
mal situations the operator must have access to key information so that he can 
observe the state of the plant quickly and interpret the situation. Only then will 
he be able to convert unwanted situations and to take action and lead the plant 
into a safe state. 
 
1.1.1 Content and form 
In order to assist the operator in carrying out his tasks and to support his situa-
tion awareness, the plant must be furnished with an appropriate information sys-
tem. And it is not enough that the displays of the information system show all 
relevant information: they must present it in a way that makes it easy for the 
operator to observe if the state of the plant has deviated from the expected; to 
find out what has happened; and to decide what to do about it. 
   Thus the problem of designing a process plant information system has two 
sides: on one hand, to select the information content of the displays; on the 
other, to choose the form in which to present the information. 
   This work focuses on process plants where an early detection of failures has 
an impact both on the economy and on the safety of the plant. In particular we 
shall also study condition monitoring which relates to the ‘health’ of a compo-
nent or a system. The condition of a component may have been reduced by deg-
radation or by a defect, but this does not necessarily influence the function of 
the component directly because a control system may compensate for the fail-
ure. The function is disturbed only when the control system is no more able to 
compensate. The purpose of the condition monitoring is to be aware of incipient 
failures before they disturb the function of the system or the plant. Besides, 
condition monitoring is a valuable tool for maintenance planning. 
1.1.2 The design problem 
When an interactive screen-based information system is installed in the control 
room of a process plant, the operator may be provided with almost unlimited 
access to information. It seems fair to expect that the designers of such informa-
tion systems should not just be concerned with assessing the content of the in-
formation, but should also develop a strategy on how to present this information 
to the user. Yet only some few general methods have been developed to support 
the design of such systems, and general, strategic considerations are scarce. 
How is the design carried out in practice? Who are the designers? And which 
strategies do they apply? To enlighten questions like these a study of recently 
installed, screen-based control rooms was carried out, Paulsen and Weber [36].  
The over-all conclusion of the study was that at the four plants in question the 
screen-based information systems present the information in a rather unsophis-
ticated form based mainly on mimic diagrams, with measured parameters dis-
played as digits. 
   To establish if some design strategy had been followed, both regarding con-
tent and form of the information, a questionnaire was handed out. The persons 
who had designed the displays filled in the questionnaires; at three of the plants 
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these were operators and at the fourth one it was an employee from the electric-
ity department. At the three plants where an operator had been in charge of the 
design the display design was mainly based on experience; at the fourth one the 
displays merely copied the PI diagram (Piping and Instrumentation diagrams). 
Hence, it came out that strategies were almost entirely absent. 
1.1.3 Why this lack of a strategy? 
One reason could be that little work has been done in the field, especially with 
strategies that can be applied by non-scientific staff. Besides the software for 
display design tends to focus on mimic diagrams; these are well known and it is 
fairly easy to copy the PI diagrams. 
The mimic-diagram approach in the design of information systems means that 
the possibilities inherent in the computer-based systems are not utilised to the 
full. Much relevant information about the operation and condition of the plant 
can be extracted by the computer systems. For example one may calculate illus-
trative parameters such as energy flow, efficiencies of heat exchangers, fouling 
factors, conditions of components, system functions and characteristics, and 
various indicators of a deviation from expected behaviour. 
Information systems still tend to be based on a one-to-one relation between 
measurement and information unit presented, just as in the control rooms of 
former days where the mimic diagrams were painted on the wall and an instru-
ment was typically located just at the measuring point in the mimic diagram. In 
the old control rooms, though, there was a variation as to how the measurements 
were presented: some were shown on meters, others were presented as functions 
of time, and others again were shown as bars (temperature, pressure). But it was 
difficult to see which information was more important than other, and this is 
still the case in rather many recently installed control rooms.  
 
A number of guidelines exist for the design and evaluation of Human Computer 
Interfaces, but they are of general nature [11] in the sense that they put up nu-
merous requirements to the content of the information system, but they do not 
indicate where and how this information is acquired. Researchers within differ-
ent disciplines have worked on how to improve on display design, especially the 
forms of presentation. Very few have worked on the content needed for early 
detection of failures and diagnostic purposes. The most well known research is 
done by J. Rasmussen [40] who has developed the Abstraction Hierarchy (AH), 
which is a framework for organizing knowledge of goals and functions based on 
a means end analysis. The AH is further used in the theory of Ecological Inter-
face Design (EID) of Vicente and Rasmussen [51]. Some of the research in 
presentation forms has been included in the NUREG-0700 rev.2 guideline for 
nuclear power plants. There is still a lack of practically useful methods for de-
termining information to be presented for the operator so he is able to observe 
incipient failures and be able to perform a diagnoses task. 
1.1.4  Goal for the thesis 
  A main goal for the author of this thesis has been to develop strategies for 
design of display systems, both regarding the content and the presentation form. 
The thesis has its main focus on the diagnostic tasks and how to observe incipi-
ent failures and disturbances in plant performance. The goal is pursued in two 
ways: firstly by carrying out a literature study of the methods developed, stress-
ing their use and the tests that have been made of them and discussing at some 
length the most important works in the field; secondly by giving an account of 
the author’s own contributions to display design, including the use and tests of 
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these displays, combined with her experience with maintenance planning, plant 
design and risk analysis methods. Four specific display systems created by the 
author are thoroughly discussed in Chapters 3-6, thus constituting a core matter 
of the work and this together with other researchers work are the background 
for the development of a strategy for display design. The strategy is based on a 
combination of a Goal-Tree and a Fault-Tree for determining the content of the 
display. The presentation form is based the different graphical elements de-
scribed in this report and a description of where and how to use them for differ-
ent purposes. 
1.1.5 Composition of the thesis 
The thesis is organised in three parts. 
 Part I, Chap. 1 – 2, explains the problem and looks into what has been done 
about it. Chap. 1 is the present introduction, which describes the background for 
the work and outlines how it is composed. Chap. 2 is an account of the ‘state of 
the art’ of display systems design, including existing standards and guidelines 
as well as recent and ongoing research, and concluding with a discussion of 
problems to be solved. 
 
   Part II, Chap. 3 – 8, is mainly concerned with the four specific display sys-
tems designed by the author:  for a pipe reactor system (Chap. 3); for a pressur-
ised nuclear reactor (Chap. 4); for a waste incineration plant (Chap. 5); and for a 
condenser (Chap. 6). Each of the four systems is treated in detail including a 
process description, the background for the design, its use and test, and an 
evaluation of the design. The development of these systems gave rise to the idea 
of using risk analysis as a structured method to determine the information con-
tent of the displays. The design of a display system requires a thorough knowl-
edge of the system in question; therefore the treatment of the four specific sys-
tems is supplemented with a general discussion (Chap. 7-8) of structured meth-
ods to give information to the designer. 
 Chap.8 describes different kinds of references for the functions and the con-
ditions of the plant. This regarding constitutive equations, design parameters, 
empirical rules etc. and their validities in different situations 
 
Part III of the thesis, Chap. 9 – 10, treats three aspects of the theoretical 
framework, as conceived by the author, for the design of display systems for 
supervision of plants and for condition monitoring of components. 
Chap. 9 describes the development of the Goal-Tree Fault-Tree (GTFT) 
method and discusses in a comparative study the difference from the Abstrac-
tion Hierarchy. 
Chap.10 concerns the presentation of the information, and gives a strategy on 
how this can be done on the basis of different known graphical elements and a 
structured method for the presentation. 
Chap.11 is a discussion of methods and how the new strategies contribute to 
the ongoing research and the guidelines. 
Chap.12 is the conclusion 
Appendix A is a paper attached concerning visualisation of outcomes from 
failure reports. 
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2. Display Systems:  State of the Art 
In a description of the state of the art of new display systems and ongoing 
work, it seems appropriate to narrow the scope to design principles that can be 
used within technical systems.  
Some of the literature we have studied were chosen because they focus on 
technical systems; others because they explain and illustrate how visualisation 
of information has been realised in different areas. Not all of the references are 
of direct interest for the research of the author because the purposes of the vari-
ous ways to visualise information may be different from ours, sometimes also 
because the work domains differ. For the present thesis, the most interesting 
work domains are those pertaining to control of safety critical process plants, 
where dynamic information is presented to the operators. The operators must 
observe changes in the dynamic system and interpret these changes. Therefore it 
is appropriate already at this point to distinguish between dynamic and static 
work domains. 
 
Still, the presentation of static information can be relevant at technical plants 
for some purposes, such as (1) studying the failure history of certain compo-
nents; (2) updating the risk analysis; and (3) optimising maintenance. A chapter 
on these issues is included in the thesis (Appendix A), but compared with the 
dynamic work domain they are of minor interest. 
 
Judging from the literature on the design of display systems including review 
papers, quite a few researchers have worked with the visualisation of informa-
tion from dynamic systems such as process plants. Rasmussen[40], Beltracci[4], 
Lindsay[22], Woods[53],Vicente[51] have developed new ideas for strategies 
for the design of displays. Sanderson [23], Jamieson [17], Han Ham[13] have 
used and tested some of the ideas. These people and their groups have made the 
most well known research in the field of dynamic work-domains.  Many of the 
display systems that have been described elsewhere e.g. Tufte and 
Sears[43][41], concern the presentation of static data from databases. Indeed 
one can get good ideas from the static presentation modes also on how to pre-
sent information about dynamic systems, provided the presentation mode can 
meet the requirements for dynamic presentations; in particular it must be easy to 
observe and easy to understand. 
One difference between presenting static data and dynamic data is exposed 
when asking who or what may activate the presentation, cf. Vicente [49]. 
  When searching information from static data, it is the user who decides when 
to do the search, and sometimes also how to do it. There is no time pressure and 
therefore no need for fast observations and actions. Looking for a house to buy, 
wanting to know the relationship between the number of bathrooms and the 
price, is not the same as supervising a nuclear reactor. The same goes for his-
toric data on components, cf. Paulsen et al.[Appendix A] where the data can be 
presented in 10 different ways to get the required information and an extra 
search can be done if required for the long time maintenance planning.  
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 Figure 1 The user is the initiator to get information 
For dynamic systems such as process control, it is the plant supervision sys-
tem that draws the operators’ attention to the fact that something in operating 
condition is not as it ought to be. To utilise this information, the user must act 
on them very quickly to find the disturbance in the plant. The operator has no 
influence as to when the system wants his attention. 
Diagnosing a failure requires that the user can find the appropiate information 
for the system in question and that the presentation is easily understood, so that 
he is able to act in time before the failure propagates into a serious event. 
 
 
User                                     Dynamic object
Static objectUser 
 
Figure 2 The dynamic object is the initiator to give information 
In the dynamic case, the design of a display system must be more stringent 
than in the static case. The reasons are (1) the time pressure problem and (2) the 
consequences in case of a misunderstanding of the information.  
2.1 Guidelines and Standards 
In this chapter of state of the art, existing standards and guidelines for display 
design will be described. Especially the recommendations from USNRC 
(United Nations Nuclear Regulatory Committee) guidelines will be explained in 
more detail. 
Guidelines and standards exist for design of new control rooms. The Human 
Computer Interface Guidelines are e.g. 
NUREG[44], ISO[16], IEEE[15], EPRI[10] 
The guidelines specify tasks to be done by the designer when developing a 
new control room. This concerns ergonomic issues such as the choice of furni-
ture, light, distance to displays, size of fonts on the display, colours, where to 
place important information, where to place the desks, the chairs etc.  
About the displays, design recommendations are given for 
 
• General display guidelines 
• Display formats 
• Display elements 
• Data quality 
• Display devices 
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The NUREG-0700 [44] Human System interface Design review Guidelines 
and the NUREG –0711[46] Human factors Engineering Program Review model 
for nuclear power plants, describe all issues to take into account when designing 
a new control room to meet the requirement for the final review by NRC. This 
also concerns test of the systems and training programs for the users. The EPRI 
and the IEEE follow the same guidance as the NUREG guidelines recommend 
and therefore in brief the NUREG guidelines concerning the content of the dis-
plays will shortly be described.  
The requirements are described on a general level and concerning the detailed 
design and integration the guideline NUREG-0711 recommend that the appli-
cants should develop their own specific and detailed guideline for new HSI 
(Human System Interface) based on the generic guideline as the present. The 
NUREG-0700 review guideline is based on the design recommendation in 
NUREG-0711 and  NUREG/CR 6633 
They also emphasize that the specific guideline should be written so it can be 
readily understood be designers. 
2.1.1 Content of the display System 
In the process of designing a display system, the first and most important task 
is to assess the information content of the displays.  
For the determination of what to be presented the NUREG guidelines recom-
mend to do an information requirement analysis. The information required is 
expressed as: 
 
Information requirements refer to what information operators need to 
safely and efficiently operate the plant. 
 
 The guidelines describe the Information requirement analysis to emphasize 
 
• Operating experience: 
Lessons learned from other complex human-machine systems, 
especially predecessor designs. 
• Functional requirement analysis and function allocations: 
Support of the operators role in the plant, e.g. appropriate levels 
of automation and manual control. 
• Task analysis:  
Tasks that are necessary to control the plant, detailed informa-
tion and control requirement for normal and accident condi-
tions. Possibility to get detailed information. 
• System requirement: 
Constraints imposed by the instrumentation and control sys-
tems. 
• Regulatory requirements:  
Applicable regulatory requirement should be identified as input 
to the HIS design process. 
• Other Requirement:  
The applicant should identify other requirements. 
 
The NUREG guidelines are updated frequently and new proven methods are 
included in the updated issues. 
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The ISO 9241-3 most concerning the ergonomic requirement for new control 
rooms are a part of the ISO 9000 requirements. 
 
NUREG/CR 6633  
About “Advanced Information Systems Design” describes new research going 
on and a discussion of the new research. The report describes e.g. the alternative 
new approach for information extraction using the Abstraction Hierarchy [40] 
and EID[51] (Ecological interface design). Both methods will be described later 
in the chapter. The word Advanced means in this connection screen based in-
formation systems. 
 
The conclusion from studying the guidelines is that the guidelines give an over-
all emphasizing description of what a detailed guideline for a specific plant 
must take into account and include. The guidelines do not recommend specific 
analysis methods for e.g. operator tasks or for systems requirements.  
2.1.2 Presentation of the information 
Standards for design of PI- diagrams, ISO[16], has been widely used in many 
years for the production of drawings. These standards specify icons for all com-
ponents. These icons can also be used in the design of mimic diagrams. 
The information formats described in the NUREG-0700 Rev.1 guidelines de-
scribe the following types of visualization techniques to use for presentation of 
information on the displays. Some of them shown on Figure 3 
 
• Mimic diagrams to present the plant layout 
• Text to give information 
• Digits for information of single values 
• Trend curves to follow measured values in time 
• Bar graphs for information of single values 
• Pie charts can be used to compare values. 
 
The NUREG-0700 Rev.2 has extended the types of visualization techniques 
with the following shown on Figure 4 
 
• Polar plots 
• Linear profile chart 
• Configural displays 
• Integral displays 
 
 
321
214
Digits Trend curves Bar graphs Pie chart
Figure 3 Common used forms for single sensor single indications 
 
The NUREG-0700 rev.2 gives very few examples, but refer to NUREG/CR 
6633 and 5908 for further information about the use of the display techniques. 
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The 6633 recommend that, configural displays may be used when operators 
must make rapid transition between high-level functions and parameter values. 
Integral displays are mentioned to be used to communicate high-levels, status-
at-a-glance information where the user may not need information on individual 
parameters to interpret the display. 
 
Integral displayConfiguralPolar plot Linear profile chart
2
8
 
Figure 4 Advanced visualization forms for multiple variables 
2.2 Ongoing research 
In different disciplines such as engineering, psychology and computer sci-
ence, research has been done to improve the information presentation systems, 
both regarding the content of the display system and the presentation of the in-
formation to the operators. 
Some of the work described are implemented in the NUREG-0700 rev.2  
guideline and some have still not proven their usability and further research is 
recommended to be done. 
The research interest in improved display design for industrial applications 
has mainly focused on display systems for nuclear power plants. The Three 
Mile Island event in 1979 led to focus on human errors and behaviour and 
thereby on the information needs of the operator. 
2.2.1 Content of the information System 
2.2.2 The Abstraction Hierarchy 
A serious challenge when designing display systems for safety critical plants is: 
How can the display be designed to meet the requirement in the guidelines that 
the operator must be able control the plant during normal and accident condi-
tions. What will happen if the plant system designer has not foreseen the acci-
dent situation? 
Is it possible to specify an information system that copes with this problem of 
unexpected events? Especially, how will the information system help to prevent 
a problem to develop into an accident situation 
A framework for the design of interface systems, with the scope to meet this 
requirement, is the Abstraction Hierarchy suggested by Rasmussen [40].  
The Abstraction Hierarchy (AH) is a framework for representing knowledge 
of a working domain on several abstraction levels. Such a hierarchy describes 
bottom-up what components and functions can be used for, how they may serve 
higher-level purposes, and top-down, how purposes can be implemented by 
functions and components. For each layer of the abstraction hierarchy informa-
tion must be extracted which can give information to the operator about avail-
able goals and functions and failed goals and functions. If a goal has failed the 
Risø-PhD-8(EN)   17
operator should be able to find the lower level function or functions failed and 
be able to re-establish the goal and thereafter find the root causes for the event. 
This is the main purpose of using the AH framework. The splitting up into ab-
straction layers is called  a means-end analysis of a physical system.  
Each layer in the AH describes the functions and the constraints belonging to 
this layer.  The constraints in this functional hierarchy are process limitations, 
constitutive equations, component characteristics, physical properties etc. The 
constraints for the different levels help in detecting if a function is unavailable, 
or partly unavailable. The AH is goal oriented, that is, each layer is a goal for 
the layer below and a necessary function for the goal above. The AH is a gen-
eral principle and does not focus on specified events. The method can be used at 
all levels of a process. The following table provides a description of the five 
levels of representation in the AH: 
 
 
LEVELS  
Functional Purpose Production flow models, system ob-
jectives, constraints, etc. 
Abstract Function 
 
Causal structures: 
Mass-, energy- and information flow 
topology, etc. 
Generalised Function 
 
“Standard” functions and processes: 
Feed back loops, heat transfer, etc. 
Physical Function Electrical, mechanical, chemical 
processes of component and equip-
ment. 
Physical Form Physical appearance and anatomy; 
material and form; locations, etc. 
 
Table 1 The Abstraction Hierarchy 
 
2.2.3 Ecological Interface design (EID) 
During the 1990’s, particularly Rasmussen together with Vicente [51] have 
further developed the abstraction hierarchy principle to what has been termed 
Ecological Interface Design (EID), comprising a model of human behaviour 
too. Human behaviour in process control is described with three different modes 
[40] skill based, rule based and knowledge based behaviour. 
• Skill based behaviour: The operator act on what he observes. 
• Rule based behaviour: The operator use rules or procedures to act on 
what he observes 
• Knowledge based behaviour: The operator must interpret what he ob-
serve and take a decision based on his knowledge. 
The knowledge-based behaviour is used in unforeseen situations and requires 
more support from the display system while the situation is not trained and no 
procedures exist. The purpose of EID is to change the knowledge-based behav-
iour into skill based or rule based behaviour. As is the case with the AH, the 
EID framework is a general principle, but not a guidance of how to do it in a 
concrete case.Vicente used the EID principle for development of the DURESS 
display [50], which will be explained later in the presentation part of this chap-
ter. 
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2.2.4 Multi level Flow Modelling (MFM) 
Another example of research in process plant modelling is the development of 
Multilevel Flow Modelling (MFM) by Lind [21] and his research group (1994) 
also on the basis of a means-end part-whole hierarchy. The MFM model has as 
its main objective to be used in the conceptual design of industrial automation 
systems. The MFM model divides the flows in mass-flows and energy-flows 
and uses different symbols for the functions in a process plants, such as symbols 
for: goal, transport, storage, source, sink, balance and barrier, Figure 5. 
 
Flow functions
Source       Transport   Storage      Barrier      Sink
Energy
Mass
 
Figure 5 Multi Level Flow symbols 
The MFM model focuses at the conservation of mass and energy. Each symbol 
is presented by its own constraint e.g. a transport function has the constraint that 
the input flow should be equal to the output flow. If a deviation occurs the sys-
tem in the lower level of the hierarchy, which has the transport function as its 
goal, must be examined. This lower system also consists of a flow diagram of 
the MFM symbols.  The information to get from a MFM model is the con-
straints on mass and energy on several abstraction levels. As for the abstraction 
hierarchy the model can be used for diagnoses of disturbed goals[21]. See also 
Larsson [19] 
2.2.5 Application of the Abstraction Hierarchy 
In his PhD project Dong Han Ham [13] has modelled the secondary circuit of a 
pressurised water reactor according to the AH. On the basis of the result, a dis-
play containing the required information was made. Dong Han Ham mentions 
that he focuses on the content of the display, not how to present the content. He 
uses bar graphs and numbers for presenting the information. He tested 3 differ-
ent display contents: the display with the usual information measured, such as 
flows and temperatures; one based on the AH with high-level information such 
as mass and energy balances; and one with some more information. The second 
display with the content determined using the AH showed a better operator per-
formance than the first one, but the third display, the one with some further in-
formation was even better. The control system of the plant was not included in 
the modelling. 
2.2.6 Test of the Abstraction Hierarchy for other domains 
The AH is developed for man-made technical systems, but this is not the same 
as saying that it cannot be used for other domains. 
In their work concerning patient monitoring systems in Intensive Care Units 
(ICU), Miller and Sanderson[23] discuss the use of the AH framework for mod-
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elling “deranged” physiological systems for the ICU information systems de-
sign. The work domain is the patient.  
Miller and Sanderson refer to a work of Sharp [42], concerning neonatal inten-
sive care units. Sharp attempts to use the AH levels as defined for other do-
mains, but he quickly concludes that these are not appropriate for this purpose; 
therefore Sharp modifies the AH formalism. Likewise Miller and Sanderson  
refer to a work of Hadjukiewicz [12] who, in a context of anaesthesia, further 
modifies the AH by removing control; however Hadjukiewicz admits that the 
conventional medical representation of the human body mixes different levels 
of abstraction.  
Miller and Sanderson claim it is important that modelling of ICU patients in-
cludes biological control systems and makes them visible. Miller and Sanderson 
conclude that the AH is not appropriate for modelling biological systems. 
Morten Lind [20] has in a study of the primary side of a pressurised water reac-
tor discussed the conceptual problems in the AH. 
 
2.2.7 Presentation of Information 
A good presentation of the required information makes the difficult interpreta-
tion task easier for the operator. It is necessary that the operator from the dis-
plays understands what is going on in the plant. Therefore the problem of how 
to present data has also been a subject for research and tests. Below we shall 
describe some of the presentation methods.  
2.2.8 Polar Plot 
Woods [53] tested the effect of using a polar plot to show the variables in the 
primary loop of a pressurised water reactor (PWR). In a polar plot the selected 
variables are normalised and each normalised value is a vector starting at the 
centre of a unit circle. 
A special feature of the presentation method is that the shape of the polar 
graph becomes asymmetric in case of a deviation in plant behaviour. The 
asymmetry makes it easy to detect that something is not as it should be. In the 
polar display the values can be structured due to the part of the system they be-
long to, so that the asymmetric shape also tells the operator where in the system 
the deviation has occurred. The polar plot supports the monitoring and acts as 
overview information and shows the operator that something has to be observed 
in more detail. The polar plot takes up little space on the screen; yet it shows 
many variables. 
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Figure 6 Polar plot of normalised variable values 
 
Several other researchers (Bennett&Flach [5], Barnes& Suantak[2], 
Coury&Boulette [8], Hurts [14], Montgomery& Bivona [26]), have made tests 
of displays, both with regard to content and to form. Most of the tests compare 
different ways to show the single measured parameters. 
We shall describe some few displays in more detail because they represent 
new ideas in display design and two of them also suggest the design of an entire 
display system. 
2.2.9 Rankine cycle display  
Beltracchi [4] designed, for a nuclear power plant, a display concept based on 
the Mollier diagram (water-steam conditions) where the Rankine cycle of the 
plant is plotted in the diagram, using entropy as abscissa and temperature as 
ordinate. The purpose is to show the state of the water-steam cycle and to be 
able to observe deviations from the expected thermodynamic states and thereby 
be able to make a diagnosis of what had happened. The diagram for a pressur-
ised nuclear reactor is shown on  Figure 7,  
 
Figure 7 Rankine cycle display for a power plant 
 
The diagram mainly shows what happens on the secondary side of the PWR 
plant while the primary side is represented by a small triangle to the left of the 
saturation line. The distance between the triangle and the saturation line is the 
safety margin for the pressure on the primary side. 
 super 
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Risø-PhD-8(EN)   21
Beltracchi was not quite satisfied with the way the primary side was shown. 
The pressure margin is an important safety parameter and in view of that, the 
presentation is not sufficiently focused. Besides, the temperature difference be-
tween the primary and the secondary side is not shown although it is an impor-
tant quantity too. As mentioned above, the Ranking cycle focuses on the secon-
dary side; for safety purposes it has less importance than the primary side. 
The interesting feature of this display is that it uses a well known thermody-
namic diagram as basis for the display and place the working points from dif-
ferent places in the plant on the diagram and get thereby the dynamic figure for 
the Ranking cycle. The display had not really success in its test in a simulator. 
The operators did not like it. Perhaps the information they got out of the display 
was of minor interest and furthermore is entropy an awkward parameter that the 
operators do not have a relation to. That was the explanation the author got from 
the test persons. The test persons were all operators at nuclear power plants. 
2.2.10 Configural display 
Based on the work of Beltracchi, Lindsay [22] designed a display for a so-
dium cooled nuclear reactor where the temperatures in the plant are presented in 
a polygonal graph. The Mollier diagram is shown in the display in the same way 
it was in the Beltracchi display for the secondary side of the reactor plant (is not 
shown on Figure 8) 
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Figure 8 Lindsay's  display for a sodium cooled reactor 
 
Lindsay designed an entire display system for the reactor, but the display 
shown in the figure is the most innovative feature of his work on how to present 
the temperatures in the system. The figure shows a simple drawing of the differ-
ent main systems of the plant, namely  
Location 
• the reactor, which is cooled by sodium 
• the heat exchanger, transporting the heat to a sodium loop 
• evaporators (steam generators), using the heat from the sodium loop 
• super heaters, also using the heat from the sodium loop 
 
The bold line figures show, in their corners, plots of temperature against posi-
tion of measurement. In addition to presenting the temperatures, these plots also 
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give information about the coolant increases and decreases in the three systems. 
Besides, it is easy to follow the difference in temperature between the secondary 
and the primary side. The figure for the secondary side must show a lower tem-
perature than the one for the primary side, because this indicates that the secon-
dary side is able to transport the heat away from the primary side. The differ-
ence in temperature did not come forward in the Beltracchi-display although it 
is just as important as the pressure margin in the water-based, pressurised reac-
tors.  Test of the display was a success and the operators were very satisfied 
with the display. 
The displays of Beltracci and Lindsay were both called Configural displays 
and are now included the NUREG-0700 guideline from 2002 as a form recom-
mended to use. The displays were made around 1987. 
2.2.11 Dynamic interface design (Paulsen Display) 
Paulsen [33] presents the design of a display system for pipe reactors where 
the variation across the plant in temperature as well as in pressure is shown by 
means of connected lines. The idea is inspired by the Lindsay’s and Beltracchi’s 
displays, using the saturation curve as a lower limit for the pressure, to warn 
against a situation where the water could start boiling in the pipes. The system, 
which has been implemented at a pipe reactor plant and has been in use for sev-
eral years, is described in detail elsewhere in this work. No strategy for selec-
tion of the information to show was used. The news was just to show the meas-
ured variables in a graphical manner and add the calculated saturation pressures 
from the measured temperatures.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 9  Paulsens’ display for a pipe autoclave 
 
The display technique is the same as for Lindsays’ display with a position in 
the plant as the x-axis and a scale for the measured variables on the y-axis. 
Upon this drawing are the working points for different places in the plant placed 
and the points for the saturation pressure for each of these points.  
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 2.2.12 Pressure margin on a Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR)  
Weisang (in [48]) has created the display shown on Figure 10 to support the 
monitoring of the pressuriser in a PWR or especially the pressure margin for the 
reactor pressure. The display is implemented on a simulation model of an ad-
vanced reactor type in Korea.  
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Figure 10 Implemented display for a pressuriser 
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Figure 11 Illustrate the idea behind fig.10 
 
In a PWR the pressure in the reactor must be above the saturation pressure, to 
prevent boiling in the core. This is ensured in the following way:  
  Risø-PhD-8(EN) 24
The pressuriser is equipped with heating elements that keep the temperature at 
a higher level than in the reactor tank; consequently the pressure is also higher 
than the saturation pressure in the reactor tank. The pressuriser contains water 
and saturated steam, that i.e., the working point for the pressuriser is on the 
saturation curve. The display shows the saturation curve and the working point 
of the pressuriser. The working point of the reactor is shown too; it lies above 
the saturation curve. 
If a line is drawn from the temperature of the reactor on the x-axis to the pres-
sure of the pressuriser, the pressure margin can be seen as the vertical distance 
between the working point of the reactor and the saturation curve. The display is 
a good illustration of how to use a reference, in this case the saturation curve for 
steam, in the display design. The display shows the primary operating objective 
of the pressuriser, which is to keep the reactor pressure above the saturation 
pressure. The information to show comes from the knowledge of the whole pur-
pose of the pressuriser: Keep the pressure in the reactor above saturation pres-
sure. The display technique is based on the steam saturation curve, which is the 
characteristic for the pressuriser behaviour, but it is also the critical lower limit 
curve for the pressure in the reactor. The actual working points of the pressur-
iser and the reactor are shown on display too. The technique is the same as for 
Beltraccis’ display with the basis display showing the saturation curve and the 
working point for the whole plant. 
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2.2.13 The DURESS display  
 Vicente designed a display for a dual tank water system [52] to support the 
control of the system, Figure 12  
 
 
 
Figure 12 Mimic diagram of the dual water tank system 
 
The content in Vicente’s presentation is based on an application of the Ab-
straction Hierarchy. The equation 
 
ENERGY  =  MASS  x  SPECIFIC HEAT  x  TEMPERATURE   
               E = M * ρ * T 
 
is used for the presentation in the following way: 
 
Energy
Temperature
Slope=M*c
 1
T
E
M1*c
M2*c
 
Figure 13 Principle of the DURESS display 
 
 
 
The mass inventory of a system multiplied by the specific heat  M*c equals 
the slope of the line representing the energy  E of the system as function of the 
temperature T. A change in temperature will change the energy according to the 
line. In case the mass inventory changes, the slope of the line will change too as 
seen on the Figure 13, for mass inventory values M1 and M2. The presentation 
of the principle is rearranged accordingly, as shown in Figure 14. 
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Mass
Energy
Temperature  
Figure 14  Rearranged presentation 
 
The following figures show different applications of the principle. 
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Figure 15  Use of the equation E=M*T*ρ 
ρ=specific heat 
 
The following representation showing inventory changes is also used for the 
advanced DURESS display.  
 
 
Flow in
Flow out
Decreasing level                      Increasing level  
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Figure 16 Change of inventory 
 
The principle in Figure 16 is that inflow and outflow are shown as horizontal 
bars and a line connects the endpoints of the two bars. If the line has a negative 
slope the mass inventory is decreasing, and a positive slope indicates an increas-
ing mass inventory.  
 
The final display, using the two principles is shown in Figure 17 
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Figure 17 Display for a dual tank water system 
 
The display has been tested on a simulator over a two-year period. The use of 
the AH strategy and the display design has led to positive results such as a faster 
diagnosis of an initiating event.  
The content in Vicente’s presentation is as described earlier based on an ap-
plication of the Abstraction Hierarchy.  
The presentation technique is very complex and does not fit into the types de-
scribed in the guidelines. The technique of using a linear equation connecting 
two values, in this case the mass and energy, can be adopted as an idea for simi-
lar equations. 
 
2.2.14 Multi Level Flow Displays 
Prætorius [38] elaborates the concept of Multi Level Flow Modelling (MFM), 
developed by Lind [21] to facilitate the design of displays for a pressurised nu-
clear power plant to be used for diagnoses purposes.  
Figure 18 shows the flow of energy through the plant from its source, the reac-
tor system, through the primary and secondary systems to the turbines or cool-
ing tower. The display is one of the 12 displays in the system. 
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 +/-
 Figure 18 MFM used for interface design.  
 
Symbols such as a ‘+’ sign and ‘–’ sign were included in the control system 
on the display, for example to show whether a valve is opening or closing, or 
whether a pump is speeding up or slowing down. The +/- was indicated on the 
diagram in a box shown above the function controlled. Such indications are 
supposed to appear when the control system tries to compensate for a failure, 
and it can be most helpful in diagnosing a fault because the indication turns up 
before the goals has been disturbed. The displays were tested on a simulator. 
The time it took to diagnose a fault in the plant using two different devices: ei-
ther a conventional mimic diagram with the measured variables as digits, or the 
displays based on the MFM. The result of the test was clearly in favour of the 
MFM model; the diagnoses of the initiating event was faster using the MFM 
display than using the mimic diagram display (the present author was one of the 
test persons). The indications of the control system activities also quickly made 
it clear that the control system started to compensate for an event in an early 
phase. The content of the display is based on a means-end hierarchy. 
The flow structures are based on the MFM icons, which could be called func-
tional mimic diagrams.  
2.2.15 Mass data display 
Beutel et al. [6] developed a mass data display for a power plant to support 
monitoring of the plant, Figure 19 
 
 
 
Figure 19 Mass data display for a power plant 
 
The display shows, in a simple way, the systems of a pressurised nuclear 
power plant. On the display we can see a number of small lines, each represent-
ing a measured value in the plant; the values are grouped according to the sys-
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tem in which they were measured. In steady state, all lines are horizontal. A 
change in the measured variables will result in a change in the lines representing 
these variables: now they appear as sloping lines. As with the polar plot, the 
operator gets an indication of a deviation in a specific system, and propagation 
of a failure can be followed. 
The mass display can be used as an overall display like the polar plot, telling 
the operator that a deviation in the measured data has occurred, and also where 
in the process it happened. About the content of the display no strategies has 
been used, but all measured values can be included. The display technique is not 
described in the guidelines. 
2.2.16 Use of the design principles 
Paassen [47] uses a combination of MFM and the IED design principles for 
designing a display for a cement mill. 
Monta et al. [25] use the idea from the DURESS display in a design for dis-
plays for a nuclear power plant. 
  Jamieson and Vicente [17] treat display design for petrochemical applica-
tions; their work is discussed here because they use several of the design ideas 
described in this chapter in their design, in order to present the information in an 
optimal way. The paper describes the use of the AH for a fluid catalytic crack-
ing unit (FCCU)[Figure 20] and the display is designed on the basis of the out-
come from the AH. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20 Cracking unit 
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The final display is separated in 8 windows of different size, called view 
ports. Each view port presents a specific part of the information required by the 
AH, and using different methods for visualizing the information. 
 
 
 
Content of the display seen on Figure 22 Display for a cracking unit 
 
View port 1 
Use of the Paulsen dis-
play. The Paulsen type 
display is used for su-
pervising  the tempera-
ture and the pressure 
distribution across the 
plant 
View port 4 
Use of the mass data 
display. The Mass data 
display is used for su-
pervising the single 
measured variables and 
thereby detecting a de-
viation from normal 
state 
View port 7 
Polar graphs for super-
vising selected variables.  
View port 2 
Use of the polar graph. 
Air supply unit and 
valve detail display 
View port 5 
Balance  
View port 3 
Use of the polar graph. 
Air supply unit and 
valve detail display 
View port 6 
Use of the DURESS 
display. The DURESS 
type display for supervi-
sion of energy and mass 
inventory etc.   
View port 8 
Use of the ideas from the 
Duress display. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The display has not been tested by operators, but would be interesting to see if 
operators can cope with the different ways of presenting information.  
It is difficult to see if the requirements from AH are fulfilled, because a de-
scription of the goal of the plant and of the processes is missing. 
There are two separate processes: One is cracking the input, but to what? The 
other is the regenerating process of the catalyst. A description of the mecha-
nisms is necessary for an evaluation of the display. Furthermore there is no 
analysis identifying the problems that must be avoided. 
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Figure 22 Display for a cracking unit 
 
Figure 21 Display for a cracking unit  
2.2.17 Reviews of advanced displays and ongoing research 
Burns and Vicente [48] describe 13 new types of displays and evaluate them 
to see how many of the requirements of the AH they fulfil. The displays de-
scribed in the paper are the most well known among new ideas for the design to 
process plants. The 13 displays are not evaluated according to test results, but 
for some of the displays the results are described. 
 
Vicente [50] gives an account of state of the art for the development and use 
of Ecological Interface Design, EID. The article describes tests from different 
work domains where EID has been used. The conclusion is that in almost all of 
the tests, the displays developed due to EID yield faster fault diagnoses than 
conventional displays. Still, more work has to be done to improve the design. 
 
 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission [1] discusses new design methodologies 
such as EID. The conclusion is, that the methods based on the AH and EID have 
not yet proven to be satisfactory for nuclear power plants. 
2.2.18 State of the art in power plant industry 
The introduction and use of screen based displays and especially of large 
screen displays in new control rooms has been a study object concerning the use 
of methods used to extract information and how to present the information for 
the operators, see Paulsen and Weber [36]. It was investigated (1) how the large 
screens are used, (2) what they are used for, and (3) whether or not a methodol-
ogy was applied when designing the displays. Shortly before the study took 
place, two new conventional power plants had been put into operation, and at 
one old conventional power plant a new screen-based control room had replaced 
the old control room. Besides, an older nuclear power plant had a screen-based 
control room under design. At all four plants, the control room was supplied 
with large screen displays. 
The study carried out at the four power plants showed that all the screen-
based information systems are based on mimic diagrams, with the measured 
parameters displayed as digits. To examine the possible use of a strategy in the 
design of the information system, a questionnaire was applied; it showed that 
such strategies were almost entirely absent, except for the nuclear power plant 
that followed the NUREG 0700 rev.1 guideline principles. 
When the design had been decided by an operator, as was the case at three of 
the four plants, it was mainly based on piping and instrumentation diagrams (PI-
diagrams); but their experience on which measured variables would be neces-
sary to see on the display played a role in the choice of data to be presented. 
Acting as a designer, the experienced operator asked himself questions like: 
What are the most frequent problems in this system? And: Which information 
do I need to observe these problems? At the fourth plant, where a control room 
designer chose the design, the diagrams on the screen were merely copies of the 
PI-diagrams showing all measured values in the same format. 
The displays were made with tools from ABB, Siemens and Hartmann & 
Brown. The tools are developed to use mimic diagrams as their main display 
form. The systems have several nice features and there are a number of possi-
bilities for information about the plant and the components in these systems; 
possibilities that were utilised at all four plants, e.g. component run time and 
control system sequence information. 
However, at none of the plants did the design include displays that are more 
advanced than mimic diagrams and trend curves. The designers of the display 
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 systems at the four power plants had not seen or heard anything about what has 
been going on in the academic world regarding the improvement of displays. 
The designers had travelled around and visited several plants in Europe to learn 
about their experience with screen-based displays and about the tools they use. 
It should be noted that a group that also included human-factors people such as 
psychologists supported the designers in the layout and choice of colours for the 
displays. 
2.3 Discussion of state of the art 
Valuable new ideas have emerged – why have, as yet, none of them been im-
plemented at the real-world process plants? 
One reason could be that only little work has been done in the field, especially 
with strategies that can be used by non-scientific staff. Besides the process con-
trol software tends to focus on mimic diagrams; these are well known and it is 
fairly easy to create them from PI diagrams. 
The mimic diagram approach means that the possibilities inherent in the com-
puter-based systems are not utilised to the full in the design of display systems. 
Much other relevant information about the plant operation and condition can be 
extracted from the computer systems, in particular information about the condi-
tion of the components. Condition monitoring of components can be carried out 
using the same measured variables that appear in the mimic diagram, but dis-
played otherwise. For example: measurements of flow and temperatures in a 
heat exchanger system can be used to calculate the heat exchanger efficiency 
which can in turn be compared with the expected efficiency. Such information 
is valuable for maintenance planning. The display showing the pressure margin 
on a PWR (Figure 10) is a nice example of presenting critical information for 
the operator in an easy way using a physical property, in this case the steam 
saturation curve, and the distance to the actual working point. 
In addition, some of the display elements still tend to be based on a one-to-
one relation between measurement and information unit, as was the case in the 
old control rooms where the mimic diagrams were painted on the wall and the 
indicator instruments were typically located just at the relevant points in the 
mimic diagram. 
In the old control rooms there was at least a difference in how the measured 
values were presented: some were shown on indicating instruments, others were 
printed on paper-plotters as functions of time. But it was difficult to see which 
information was more important than other. In many new control rooms this is 
still the case, only there the information is shown on computer displays instead.  
The reason could be that we want the information we are used to, and the de-
signers of the displays do not know all they can get with the new computerised 
system. Who has told them? Perhaps: A link is missing between the people do-
ing research in the area, the companies developing the software for display de-
sign and the end-users.  
2.3.1 What has to be done? 
It is the view of the author that the academic field in display design has not 
taken the question of the purposes of the displays into account. The need is ob-
vious because any designer of a display system must ask himself: “This display 
I am designing – what is it for, basically?” 
Looking at the various displays suggested by Lindsay, Beltracchi, Prætorius, 
Vicente, and Paulsen, one must draw the conclusion that none of them have de-
scribed, unambiguously the purpose of their displays. 
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The following is the present authors’ explanation of the purposes of some of 
the described displays. 
 
• Beltracchi wants to give information about the thermodynamic states 
in the plant.  
• Lindsay wants to show how the temperature levels, increases and de-
creases in the plant, and he uses polygons to give the operator an 
overview and enable him to see what is happening in the plant.  
• Paulsen, expanding the idea of Lindsay to include the pressures in the 
plant and their lower limit, wants to alert the operator if the function 
in some component is not as intended, or if there is a boiling some-
where in the system. 
• Vicente, by developing the DURESS display, wants to supply the op-
erator with information that, in case of an unwanted event, assists him 
in getting the system back into a safe and normal state. 
• Prætorius, by developing her display based on the MFM model, wants 
to construct a sort of advanced alarm display that tells the operator 
which function has been disturbed and then do a diagnoses task. 
• Similarly, both the polar display and the Mass Data Display can be 
characterised as overview displays that may inform the operator of a 
deviation from normal state in some area of a plant. 
 
Another piece of work that needs to be done by the designer when the content 
of a display system is determined, is to give an exhaustive classification and 
identification of the various  variables in the display systems considered here. A 
first attempt to do this could be to record as many variables as possible, describe 
them briefly and classify them as ‘very important’ over ‘important’ to ‘less im-
portant’. This should be done in a specified way, according to operation, safety, 
economy, or maintenance criteria. Some of the measured variables cannot be 
singled out but must be compared to others, to give relevant information to the 
operator. This is for example the case for temperature measurements across a 
district-heating pipe. On the other hand, some variables may stand-alone, for 
example the actual power production at a power plant. 
The identification and classification of variables have an influence on how 
they are presented in the various displays. For example, information about the 
production at a power plant is not important for evaluating the condition of 
components and does not have to be shown in a condition monitoring display, 
but should of course appear in some way in the display for operating the entire 
plant. 
There is also a need for a strategy or some advices on how to present informa-
tion. There are as described earlier some recommendations in the new NUREG 
guideline. 
 
The four following chapters describe in more details, display systems that the 
author has developed, which gives the clue to the developed strategy, which pay 
regard to the display goals and operator tasks. 
Risø-PhD-8(EN)   35
   Risø-PhD-8(EN) 36
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part II 
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3. Display System for a Pipe Reactor 
This chapter describes the development of a display system for a chemical pipe 
reactor, and experience with the system is reported. The background for the de-
velopment of the displays was that at the end of the 1970’s it was decided to in-
stall a pipe reactor pilot plant at Risø National Laboratory. 
The pilot plant was built in 1980, and it was planned to be running 24 hours a 
day for a longer period. At that time, computer based information systems were 
not available for this kind of projects. But after some years the situation had 
changed, and it became possible to design and test different types of pipe reactor 
displays. The display system was developed in 1989 by the present author and it 
was used until the pipe reactor was closed in 1997.  
3.1 Description of the Process 
The chemical pipe reactor was built to test a new method for the extraction of 
uranium by wet oxidation. The system was developed at Risø National Labora-
tory, and the aim was to test the method on an industrial scale. The uranium ore 
was provided from Kvanefjeld, Greenland. The wet oxidation process for the ura-
nium includes the following steps:  
• Creation of a slurry of grinded ore and an alcaline liquid, which was a 
mixture of water, NaHCO and NaCO. (In the pilot plant, the solid con-
tent was 50% .) 
• The slurry is heated to approx. 260 o C. 
• Oxygen is injected. 
• A reaction time of about 30 min is observed. 
• The slurry is cooled down, to below 90o C. 
• The slurry goes to a filter. 
 
During the process the uranium content of the ore is dissolved in the liquid 
and can be extracted from the liquid as Yellow Cake by a chemical precipitation 
method. 
3.2 Description of the Pipe Reactor 
A pipe reactor concept was chosen for the process. The actual type of pipe reac-
tor had been developed previously by the German company Lurgi   for the treat-
ment of bauxite for aluminium production. A pilot reactor, to be used for experi-
ments within aluminium production, was built in Germany; it was used for the 
first tests with the uranium ore, and due to the promising results a similar reactor 
was built at Risø National Laboratory in 1980. 
As mentioned above, the wet oxidation of uranium requires a temperature of 
approx. 260oC. To prevent boiling the pressure must be above the saturation pres-
sure for water at this temperature. A certain flow is also necessary in the pipes in 
order to keep the solid floating. The requirement to the flow was one of the main 
reasons to choose the pipe reactor concept. Another reason was the rather simple 
construction consisting of industrial standard high-pressure pipes instead of high-
pressure tanks. 
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 The system consists of a tank with stirring, a pre-pressure pump, a high-
pressure slurry pump, a heating system, an oxygen injection system, 2 km of reac-
tion pipes and a cooling system.  The slurry pump has a maximum capacity of 3 
m3 per hour and a maximum pressure of 160 bar. 
 
 
Pipe autoclave
Steam
O2
 
Figure 23 Sketch of a pipe autoclave system 
  
The heating system consists of four heat exchangers with concentric tubes. The 
first one is a pre-heater where the in-going slurry is pre-heated by the processed 
slurry. This pre-heater is 185 m long, its inner tube having a diameter of 20 mm. 
To increase the temperature of the slurry to the level required for the process, 
two heat exchangers of 35 m each were installed; they heat the slurry using con-
densing steam. The heated slurry passes through 1000 m of pipe, then another 
heat exchanger with steam to compensate for the temperature loss in the pipe, 
then again 1000 m of pipe, and finally the cooling in the secondary side of the 
pre-heater. 
The plant is located partly inside a building, partly outside. The tank is at the 
ground floor of the building, and the pump is placed in the basement. The heat 
exchangers and pipes are situated on a field outside the building. The filter system 
is located at the ground floor of the building, and so is the control room. 
The system is equipped with sensors to measure temperatures, pressures and the 
speed of the pump and the indicators are placed on a panel beside the high-
pressure pump in the basement of the building. The presentation is as single sen-
sors single indicators each on its own instrument. There are 7 temperature indica-
tors and 5 pressure indicators. The speed of the pump is not measured, but a set 
point is given to the control system of the pump. The control room also gives 
room for two plotters with trend curves for the temperatures, respectively for the 
pressures. The system was designed for manual operation, in order to keep it as 
simple as possible. In the system, two variables are adjustable: the speed of the 
pump and the amount of steam for heating the slurry. Thereby the velocity of the 
slurry and the temperature of the medium can be controlled. 
3.3 Process design requirements  
The requirement to the system was that it should be able to process 3 m3 of 
slurry (with 50% solid) per hour. The process should be performed at 260oC, 
with a reaction time of 0.5 hour. 
To get a sufficient mixture with the oxygen a fully developed turbulent flow is 
necessary; i.e. the Reynolds number must be high. Besides, the transport of 
slurry requires a certain velocity to keep the particles floating. To secure a suffi-
cient lift of particles, pipes with a diameter of 28 mm were chosen; they should 
ensure the required turbulent flow and a velocity over the critical value, that is, 
the lowest velocity at which the solid stays floating in the liquid. Operation below 
the critical velocity will result in a severe wear of the pipes.  
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Aiming at a reaction time of 0.5 hours, the length of the reaction pipes was set 
to 2000 m. 
To prevent boiling in the system at a process temperature at 260°C, the pres-
sure must be higher than the saturation pressure for water in the entire reactor. 
Boiling in the system will decrease the slurry temperature, increase the speed of 
the slurry and thereby reduce the reaction time. The pipe autoclave has therefore 
been provided with a pressure reduction pipe in the last part of the autoclave to 
keep the pressure inside sufficiently high. The depressurisation is performed in a 
50 m long pipe with a small inner diameter, 10mm, at the exit of the secondary 
side of the pre-heater. 
A high-pressure diaphragm slurry pump was chosen for pumping the slurry. 
The pump has a maximum capacity of 3 m3/h and a maximum pressure of 160 
bars. For safety reasons the pump automatically stops if the pressure reaches 145 
bars. The pressure drop across the reactor is expected to increase during operation 
due to scaling on the surfaces of the pipes. 
Heating of the slurry takes place in heat exchangers, as described earlier. 
 
3.4 Operational requirements  
During a wet oxidation process in a pipe autoclave, the operator must meet 
several requirements. In this chapter we shall merely discuss those requirements 
that were known before the initial start-up of the plant. 
The requirements are the following: 
 
• Start up requirement 
• Requirement to normal operation 
• Requirements for closing down the plant 
3.4.1  Start up requirement 
The first task is to start up the system, which is done by operating the process 
with water, without ore, until the desired process temperature has been reached 
in the reaction pipes. At that point, the slurry, or what else has to be processed, 
is pumped into the autoclave. 
During start up it is important to overview that the temperatures measured in 
the system are continuously increasing. Furthermore it is important to ensure 
that the pressure is sufficiently high to prevent boiling in the autoclave. To 
monitor the build-up of scaling in the pipes during steady state operation it is 
important to provide the information system with a reference value, which could 
be the pressure drop across the systems, when no scaling is available, Figure 20. 
The reference value could also be the pressure drop measured at the start of the 
process in question. During shut down of the plant, also operating with water, 
comparable measurements are used to calculate the average scaling thickness in 
the pipes. 
 
Information that must be presented to the operator during start-up in order to 
meet requirements: 
To follow that the temperature is continuously increasing all over the auto-
clave, the temperatures measured, shown as trend curves was needed. These 
curves show if the temperature increase in time in the reactor were as expected. 
It is not easy to make a reference curve while the speed of the increase of tem-
perature is very dependent of the outside temperature and the wind speed, but 
the temperature should increase in time. 
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 To follow that the heat exchangers behave as intended, the temperature in-
crease across each heat exchanger must be present too. 
To overview if the pressure in the autoclave is sufficiently high to prevent 
boiling, the pressure must be present together with the saturation pressure, cal-
culated for each measuring point of temperature. 
To make it clear when the required reaction temperature is reached, the set 
point Tset  must be present. 
 
Task during 
start-up 
Vari-
ables 
Information Presentation 
Follow the tem-
peratures during 
start up. 
Follow each heat 
exchanger 
All T’s Rate of change Temperatures as function 
of time. 
Temperature increase 
across each heat ex-
changer 
Tset 
Overview pres-
sures and satura-
tion pressure 
All P’s  
and 
Psat
Margin to critical 
pressure. 
Bars on a mimic diagram 
or curves. 
End of start up T and 
Tset
Goal state Comparable presentation 
of T and Tset
Figure 24 Start-up information 
3.4.2 Requirements to normal operation  
During normal steady state operation there are two main requirements that 
should be meet. Firstly, it must be ensured that the state in the autoclave fulfils 
the conditions for the chemical process to take place. This has three implica-
tions: (1) the temperature in the reaction pipes must be maintained at levels re-
quired for the process, (2) the pressure after the pump must be kept sufficiently 
high, and (3) the velocity of the fluid must be kept above the lower limit for the 
fluid in question. Regarding (1), it should be added that during steady state op-
eration it is particularly necessary to keep watching the temperature in the reac-
tion pipes. If it becomes too high or too low, the steam supply must be regulated 
accordingly. 
Secondly, the pressure drop across the autoclave must be followed closely. 
An increase of the pressure drop is expected due to scaling on the pipe surfaces. 
The pressure after the pump must not exceed a maximum of 145 bars; if it does, 
the operator may decide to reduce the speed of the pump and thereby the veloc-
ity of the fluid as well as the pressure drop across the system. However he must 
also be careful not to reduce the velocity of the fluid below the critical velocity 
for the slurry so that the solid keeps floating and the requirements for a full tur-
bulent flow are still met. 
 If the pressure decreases unexpectedly, the usual cause is a reduced ve-
locity of the medium. This can be due to problems with the pump or to a leak in 
the system. The operator must make a diagnosis of the problem, and he must 
also decide when to clean the autoclave to get rid of the scaling. 
 
Information that must be presented to the operator in normal condition: 
To overview that the required reaction temperatures are present in the reaction 
pipes, the temperatures in the reaction pipes as well as Tset must be shown. It is 
only the temperatures in the reaction pipes that have an interest, while the pres-
sure is of interest in all points of the autoclave. 
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To monitor that the pressures in the autoclave are sufficiently high to prevent 
boiling, the pressures measured as well as the saturation pressure, calculated for 
each measuring point, must be shown. 
To ensure that the fluid velocity V is above the critical velocity Vcrit, these two 
quantities must be available, and so must the Reynolds number, to check it is 
sufficiently high. The actual velocity V and Reynolds number are continuously 
calculated from the flow measurements while the critical velocity Vcrit for the 
slurry in question is calculated before the operation starts. 
To follow the build-up of scaling, the pressure drop across each part of the 
autoclave must be monitored and compared to the initial pressure drops for a 
clean system. 
To be aware of when the maximum pressure for the pump is reached, the 
pressure just after the pump must be followed.  
 
Tasks in Nor-
mal operation 
Variables Information Presentation 
Sufficient reac-
tion tempera-
ture 
T and Tset in 
reaction pipes 
Temperature margin. Trend curves 
or overview 
curves 
Sufficient pres-
sure 
P and Pset all 
over the auto-
clave 
Pressure margin. Overview 
curves 
Sufficient ve-
locity 
Flows, Fcrit, Re Safety for the system. 
Availability of turbu-
lent flow 
Shown on the 
pump display 
Pressure drops dPs’ and dPclean Availability of scaling Bar graphs 
Maximal pump 
pressure 
Ppump and Pmax Safety margin for the 
pump 
Pmax as an 
upper limit for 
the pressure. 
Table 2 Information needs during normal operation 
3.4.3 Requirement when closing down the plant. 
When the plant is closed down, the system is cooled by water until the tem-
perature is below 100°C, so that the system is below the boiling point and the 
pump can be stopped. The task in this situation is to change the feeding from 
the slurry to water, close the steam supply and monitor the temperature decrease 
in the system. During this period the pressure drops across the heat exchanger 
and the diameter of the reaction pipes must be measured, to be able to calculate 
the thickness of the scaling that has been built up during the process. 
 
Data that must be presented to the operator: 
During cooling down of the plant the highest temperature will be just after the 
pre-heater, while the incoming water is still heated in the pre-heater. The tem-
perature must be below 100°C before the pump can be stopped.  
 
Tasks during shut 
down 
Vari-
ables 
Information Presentation 
Overview the max. 
temperature 
Tmax Closing down 
status 
All temperatures 
Table 3 Information needs during closing down the plant 
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 3.5 Experience with Operating the Plant 
Operation of the plant was rather simple during normal conditions, but the prob-
lems with scaling occurred very fast and caused the pressure drop across the sys-
tem to increase, primarily in the heat exchangers and in the first 300 meters of the 
reaction pipes. When the pressure reaches 140 bars, a decrease in the velocity of 
the slurry is necessary to continue operation, if possible, due to critical velocity. If 
it is not possible to continue operation, a cleaning of the pipes is necessary. The 
pressure after the pump in the beginning of the operation with slurry was about 
120 bars. 
In normal condition, the velocity of the slurry is proportional to the speed of the 
pump; therefore the velocity of the slurry can be reduced by slowing down the 
pump. The same technique is used to prolong the reaction time. Uncontrolled de-
crease of the velocity of the slurry happened often due to problems with the suc-
tion valves and other problems with the suction side of the pump system. The ve-
locity of the slurry in these situations was not known. The pressure drop across 
the depressurisation pipe could to some extent act as an indicator of the flow.  
Due to a limited amount of steam, problems with heating the system also oc-
curred during cold weather where the heat loss to the surroundings increased. 
With the ‘single-sensor single-indicators’ indication system it was hard to get an 
overview of what was happening in the system when something went wrong or 
did not behave as expected. Even that all operators of the system had participated 
in the development and building of the plant, so they knew it well, but that is not 
the same as knowing the behaviour of the plant during operation. 
The chemical experiments were successful, but mechanical problems must be 
solved and effective cleaning methods must be developed before an industrial 
plant can be built. 
In 1989, the plant was used in a test concerning wet oxidation of polluted soil. 
The main pollution was organic material. Due to the development of simple 
graphical PC systems and data acquisition systems, it was decided in 1989 to in-
stall an on-line PC-based interface to the system. The interface project was also 
an opportunity to test and develop new ideas on how to present information ap-
propriately to the operators.  During the operation, various displays were designed 
and tested. Experience clearly showed that it was important to monitor the condi-
tion of the components, because scaling was expected, but not at that speed that it 
was actually building up during operation. Pump problems had not been foreseen 
to the extent that they appeared.  
3.6 Display Design for the Pipe Reactor 
 
The display system ended up with including five displays:  
 
1. An overview display showing the temperature- and pressure distribu-
tion across the pipe autoclave. 
2. A condition monitoring display showing the pressure drops across dif-
ferent parts of the autoclave. 
3. A display with trend curves for temperatures.  
4. A display with trend curves for pressure drops. 
5. A display for condition monitoring of the pump. 
 
All five displays were developed mainly on the basis of the experience the par-
ticipants got, during operation of the plant in 1980-81, with chemical as well as 
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with mechanical and fouling problems. The displays (the text of which is in Dan-
ish) were shown on a single computer screen in the control room. 
3.6.1 Display No. 1  
The idea for the first display originates from the work of Lindsay [22] who 
designed the display system for a Sodium Cooled reactor. 
 Due to the temperature requirements for the chemical process, it is im-
portant to know the temperatures in the reactor, especially the temperature be-
fore the reaction pipes. The three lines in the display ( Figure 25) shows the dis-
tribution across the reactor of, respectively, the temperature (lower line), the 
pressure (upper line) and the saturation pressure (middle line). The saturation 
pressure is calculated from the measured temperatures in the reactor; it must be 
considered a lower limit for the pressure in the pipes. In the bottom of the dis-
play is inserted a mimic diagram of the pipe reactor, with the temperatures and 
pressures shown digitally. 
 During the development of the display, it has been the main scope to 
give the operator an easy overview of the temperatures and pressures in the sys-
tem, including the possibility to check if the heat exchangers do provide the in-
tended temperature increase. The mimic diagram helps the operator to recall in 
which components the different functions occur; thereby it is made easier for 
him to fast observe if a component does not function as intended. 
 
 
 
Figure 25 Display 1 
 
 Experience has proved that the display shows the information needed and 
provides a suitable overview of the system and the process. Actually it turned out 
to contain even more information than it was designed for. This is perhaps not 
surprising in view of the fact that the information level in the former control room 
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 was fairly low, although the plotters did give some information about stability of 
the pressures and temperatures during steady state operation. 
It is the authors’ judgement that Display No.1 presents the data in a most infor-
mative way. The shape of the temperature distribution informs about the state of 
the process, and whether the system is operating satisfactorily. The saturation 
pressure curve can be used in two ways: to check the safety margin from the boil-
ing point, and to get an alert when the reaction time had to be prolonged, which is 
effectuated by decreasing the velocity of the slurry. In case where the velocity has 
to be reduced it is easy on the display to follow when the process approaches the 
boiling point and thereby just reduce the flow so boiling still is avoided. The pres-
sure distribution diagram includes information about the distance to the lower 
limit. It is also easy to observe the increase in the total pressure drop across the 
autoclave, that is, the increase in the pressure measured on the pressure side of the 
pump. Such an increase could be the result of an increased fouling in the pipes. 
The display points directly to this problem when it arises, and by observing the 
steepness of the pressure curve the operator can see where the maximum fouling 
occurs. A pressure increase could also arise as a consequence of a partly blocked 
pipe, but this would be observed as an increased pressure drop in just one of the 
reactor parts in between the pressure measurements 
That the diaphragm pump is running smoothly is checked in the display by 
looking at the pressure after the pump and judge if it is stable. In case of problems 
with the suction valves the pressure will drop because of the decrease in flow.  
To check that the steam generator works as intended the operator just has to 
look at the temperature increase across the heat exchangers.  
 
 
Figure 26  Exothermal reaction in the pre heater 
In the pre heater, where the incoming slurry is heated by the out coming and 
processed slurry, it is expected that the temperature increase for the incoming 
slurry is equivalent with the temperature decrease of the out coming slurry. The 
flows are the same on both sides of the heat exchanger. On the display the two 
lines showing this increase and decrease of temperatures will be parallel, but dur-
ing operation with polluted soil in the development phase of the display system, it 
was observed that the two temperature lines were not parallel. What was ob-
served, were exothermal reactions starting in the pre-heater, which added some 
extra energy to the incoming slurry and with the consequence that the temperature 
increase were larger than the temperature decrease on the outgoing slurry (Figure 
26, which is a part of Figure 25).  
 
∆E primary = ∆E secondary + E exotherm
 
This observation gave the information that an exothermal process starts below 
220oC, which is the maximum temperature the incoming slurry gets in the pre 
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heater. In the same manner exothermal reactions could be observed in the reaction 
pipe. The reaction heat and the amount of organics oxidised can both be calcul-
ated from these observations. It had not been planned to quantify the oxidation by 
measuring the temperature, just by taking out samples now and then. The flow of 
the slurry was measured directly, but due to large uncertainties the measurements 
were not usable. Instead the flow was calculated from the speed of the pump but 
that can be done only if there are no problems with the pump. A better indicator 
of the flow, and thereby the velocity of the slurry supply, was the pressure drop 
across the drossel pipe (depressurising section). No scaling occurred in this pipe. 
During start up and closing down of the plant the dynamics could be seen on the 
display as well. 
After having worked with the display over a period, the operators stated that the 
display made them able to understand much better what was going on in the plant. 
It had become easy to be aware of problems, to observe them at an early stage, 
and to diagnose them once they had occurred.  
A replay of data from a uranium extraction operation in the past, during which 
it had become difficult to reach the required process temperatures, showed what 
the reason was: boiling had occurred in the reaction pipe. Boiling forces the tem-
perature to decrease with the pressure drop, and the preheating becomes ineffi-
cient. This event could have been avoided if the display had been available during 
the uranium extraction process; and there were other similar findings. – Part of 
the display (Figure 25) that indicated boiling in the autoclave during the uranium 
extraction operation is shown in Figure 27 
 
 
Figure 27 Boiling in the Pipe Reactor 
3.6.2 Displays No. 2 
The second display [Figure 28], having the same mimic diagram as on Dis-
play No.1 [Figure 25], shows the pressure drops across the different compo-
nents of the pipe reactor: The Pre-heater, both the primary and secondary side, 
three heat exchangers, the one reaction pipe and the second reaction pipe. It was 
not possible to measure the pressure drop across each heat exchanger and the 
first reaction pipe, while measuring points were not installed for measuring the 
pressure drop for each of these components. Coloured bar graphs indicate the 
actual pressure drops during operation, green if below or equal reference pres-
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 sure and red colour if above. The non-coloured bar graphs show the correspond-
ing reference pressure drops for a clean plant; the temperature distribution is 
shown as in Display No. 1. 
Display No. 2 was developed to enable the operator to readily observe a scal-
ing problem when it occurred, and to decide when and where to clean the sys-
tem. Later the data were used in another program to calculate the average thick-
ness of the scaling. It was part of the aim of the project to determine where scaling 
happened in the reactor, and to calculate the scaling rate. The end task was to be 
able to calculate the appropriate time interval between cleaning of an industrial 
reactor with a greater diameter than the pilot reactor. 
 
 
Figure 28 Display No.2 
  
The use of Display No. 2 during operation turned out to be scarce. One reason 
is that one could not see the pressure distribution across the reactor and the 
lower limit for the pressure, especially not the pressure after the pump. The 
monitoring of the pressures had a higher priority than the monitoring of tem-
perature. The pressure can suddenly fail due to pump failure, but the tempera-
ture does not change so fast due to the high heat capacity in the system. 
Discussions with Leo Beltracchi also made it clear to the author that while 
Display No. 1 shows the function of the system, Display No. 2 shows the condi-
tion of the heat exchanger and the reaction pipes or more precisely their degra-
dation due to fouling. Maintenance people must look at the condition of the sys-
tem from time to time; those who operate the system here and now do not have 
to. Still, the condition information is valuable for the operator too, to see how 
close the plant is to the point where a cleaning is necessary, and to use this in-
formation in his operation planning. 
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3.6.3 Displays No. 3 
The third display [Figure 29] shows the trend curves for the temperatures and 
they are useful during start up because it allows the operator to check if all heat 
exchangers function as intended, which mean that the temperature increase across 
each heat exchanger is as expected. The heat exchangers, using condensing 
steam, consist of concentric pipes. The condensed water is released during 
steam traps. Because the plant was placed outside and some of the experiments 
took place during winter, it sometimes occurred that the steam traps were fro-
zen. However it was only observed when the condensed water reached the level 
of the inner pipe, causing the heat rate to decrease and, when the pipes were 
covered with water, to stop. This situation was detected rather easily looking at 
the trend curves where the temperature increase across one or more heat ex-
changers stops.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 29 Display No. 3 
3.6.4 Display no. 4 
The fourth display [Figure 30] shows the trend curves for the pressure drops 
across different sections of the pipe autoclave. The purpose of the display was to 
follow the pressure increase due to scaling across each section of the system, and 
thereby get information about where and at what temperatures the scaling oc-
curred. This information is important when designing a large industrial plant, 
where cleaning facilities must be planned before the building of the plant and not 
as in a pilot project with rather primitive hoses and portable acid tanks were suffi-
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 cient. However the display suffers from the lack of information of the flow, 
which has a great influence on the pressure drop. A change in the pressure drops 
could be a result of a decrease in speed of the pump but it could also be a result 
of a failure in the suction valves.  
 
 
Figure 30 Display No.4 
On this display the pressure drop across the depressurising pipe is the yellow 
curve. This pressure drop could be used as an indicator for changes in the flow, 
while no scaling appeared in that pipe, which would have changed the pressure 
drop even with constant flow. This pressure drop was used in the calculation 
afterward for estimating the scaling thickness. 
3.6.5 Display No. 5 
The fifth display [Figure 31] summarises the condition of the slurry pump. The 
purpose of the display is to check if the pump is operating on its characteristic 
and to follow the distance of its speed to the lower limit for the speed, which 
could be the critical velocity for the slurry. Besides, the display gives an alert if 
either the Reynolds number or the pressure in the reactor has become too low. 
The display presents all operation limits as well as the pump characteristic. 
Unfortunately the display did not come into use, due to faulty flow measuring 
equipment. 
The display for the pump is an example on how different component charac-
teristics can be used in combination. The pump is a positive displacement pump 
of the type diaphragm pump with three pistons. The pump is developed for 
slurry transport at high pressures. The flow through a positive displacement 
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pump is proportional to the speed of the pump and therefore is the characteristic 
for the pump a straight line. 
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Figure 31 Display No.5 
 
As discussed above, the transport of slurry requires a certain velocity of the 
fluid to keep the solid particles floating. Therefore there is a lower limit for the 
flow rate. This critical velocity depends on (1) the pipe diameter of the con-
nected system, (2) the percentage of solid in the slurry, (3) the particle size, (4) 
the specific weight of the solid and the fluid, (5) the flow of the slurry, etc. 
The critical velocity is an absolute lower limit for the velocity of the slurry. If 
it gets below the critical velocity, severe wear and damage of the pipes may be 
the outcome. 
Operation at the critical velocity proved to lead to a Reynolds number higher 
than required; therefore it is hardly necessary to show the lower limit of the 
Reynolds number in the display. 
There is also an upper limit to the flow rate, viz. the one caused by maximal 
speed of the pump. 
Due to the velocity requirements and the problems with the pump, which can 
lead to flow problems, a display for condition monitoring like the one in Figure 
31 will help the operator and the maintenance planners in their decisions about 
when to take action to prevent failures. The problems experienced with this type 
of pump are typically concerned with the tightness of the suction valves or with 
air in the suction line. In both cases the consequence is a reduced flow, resulting 
in a working point below the pump characteristic. If the pump is automatically 
regulated, the control will compensate for the deviation in flow and increase the 
speed of the pump. The pump has a maximum speed corresponding to the 
maximum flow on the display. 
The result of these considerations is that there is a triangle of accessible points 
in the diagram for the operation of the pump. Depending on the connected sys-
tem and the process, yet other limits can be implemented in the display. For ex-
ample, the pressure in the system is subject to a lower limit because the slurry 
will start boiling in the pipes in case the pressure gets below the saturation pres-
sure. Similarly, to keep the process temperature at 260oC requires a certain pres-
sure and therefore also a certain flow which can be shown in the diagram as an-
other lower limit for the flow. 
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3.6.6 Discussion of the pipe reactor displays 
The 1st and the 5th  displays are the most valuable displays of the five displays.  
The first display gives quite a lot of information about system and compo-
nents functions, but it is difficult to observe degrated condition in the compo-
nents by observing the steepness of the pressure curve. For this observation the 
2nd display can be used. Changes in time cannot be observed on the or display 1 
or 2 and therefore the display must be supported by trend curves. Even that 
trend curves are necessary to have to follow deviations on measured and calcu-
lated information, is it difficult to get and overview of the plant situation from 
trend curves alone.  
The 5th display is a display for condition monitoring of the pump. The display 
use the same ’format’ as Beltracci use with a reference curve, here the pump 
characteristic, as the basis display and then the actual working point and limits 
can be plotted on the display.  This type of displays can be recommended for 
condition monitoring of also other components. 
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4. Overview Display for a Pressurised 
Water Reactor 
The positive experience with graphical displays for a pipe reactor led to a coop-
eration with the OECD Halden reactor project in Norway concerning the devel-
opment of a graphical overview display for a pressurised water reactor simulator 
in Halden.   
4.1 Description of a Pressurised Water Reactor  
A pressurised water reactor (in the sequel: PWR) consists of a primary and a 
secondary side, each with a separated closed loop water system, Figure 32. An 
electrical generator system is attached to the secondary system. 
The reactor in the primary side produces hot water, approx. 300oC. A steam 
generator separates the primary and the secondary side. In the steam generator 
the water on the secondary is converted into steam, which is next converted into 
mechanical energy in the turbines by a rotating shaft. This rotating shaft rotates 
a electrical generator and the mechanical energy is converted into electrical en-
ergy. This is a common energy conversion system for power plants, independ-
ently of the fuel type used. Schematically, the process can be depicted like this: 
 
   
 
 
In the following way: 
 
 
 
 
 
In most thermal plants the steam is produced in a boiler, not in a separate sec-
ondary system, as is the case as in the PWR. But the energy conversion princi-
ple is still the same as for the secondary side of a PWR.  
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Figure 32 PWR plant 
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 Regarding its purpose, the steam generator can be compared with the boiler in 
a conventional power plant, and also with the reactor in a boiling water nuclear 
plant, but the PWR steam generator uses hot water produced on the primary side 
in the reactor as source of energy. The most common fuels are gas, coal, oil, and 
uranium. 
 The primary side consists of the reactor with control rods, a closed cooling 
system and a pressuriser system as the main components. The secondary side 
contains a feed water system with pumps and heat exchanger, steam generators, 
high-pressure turbines, low-pressure turbines and condensers.  
In a PWR, the reactor is totally filled up with pressurised water. To avoid 
boiling in the system, the pressure, maintained by the pressuriser, is kept above 
the point of saturation. Boiling in the reactor would reduce the heat transfer 
from the core to the water and could result in a severe damage of the core.  
The pressuriser is equipped with heating elements to increase the temperature 
in the pressuriser above the temperature in the reactor, and thereby increase the 
pressure of the whole primary system above the point of saturation. The differ-
ence between (1) the actual pressure in the reactor and (2) the saturation pres-
sure at the actual temperature in the reactor is an essential quantity and must be 
supervised: it is the safety margin for the pressure Alternatively, one might 
measure the difference between (1’) the actual temperature and (2’) the satura-
tion temperature at the actual pressure; indeed this so-called temperature safety 
margin is used for supervision at some nuclear power plants. 
Water is heated in the reactor and transported into the steam generators where 
it cools off during the process and is returned to the reactor. The primary system 
is provided with a number of high-pressure injection pumps, used during nor-
mal operation for the injection of boron for control of the neutron flux. In case 
of a leak in the primary system the system is used to maintain the water inven-
tory in the system. In normal operation one pump is running, but in emergency 
situations up to four pumps can go into duty to maintain the water inventory. 
The most common leaks arise between the primary and the secondary side in 
the steam generators. 
On the secondary side of a PWR, feed water is heated and evaporates in the 
steam generators. Steam from the generators drives the high-pressure and the 
low-pressure turbines. The low-pressure outlet steam from the turbines is con-
densed in the condenser, which is cooled with seawater, or with water from 
cooling towers. Next, the condensed water is pumped through the feed water 
system where it is heated by drain from the turbines before it enters the steam 
generators.  
There are not any serious safety problems on the secondary side itself, but the 
water flow through the secondary side of the steam generators must be able to 
transport away the heat produced in the reactor. If the secondary side cooling in 
the steam generators is failing, it can cause severe damage on the core, in par-
ticular if no emergency systems are available on the primary side. For this rea-
son, the mean temperature difference between the primary side and the secon-
dary side of the steam generator is an essential quantity to supervise too while 
the heat transfer depends on the temperature difference. The temperature on the 
secondary side must be lower than the temperature on the primary side to be 
able to transport heat away from the primary side.  
4.2  Description of the overview display. 
The main idea behind the display is to show the measured main parameters, 
and thereby the main functions that are taking place in a plant, in an direct 
graphical way by drawing lines and polygons, like in the Lindsay display but in 
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addition showing flow and pressure distributions across the plant. Main parame-
ters in the case of a PWR plant are temperature, pressure, and flows. By main 
functions in meant: Temperature increases and decreases, pressure increases and 
decreases and the flow changes in the system. Furthermore the calculated value 
for the lower limit for the pressure in the primary system must be shown. En-
ergy flows can be calculated and shown in the same way. The measure parame-
ters and the functions are indicated on a compressed mimic diagram of the 
plant, as for the pipe reactor where other plant parameters can be shown too, 
such as water levels, valve position, flow paths, pump status etc.  
The first draft for an overview display for the PWR was inspired by the pipe 
autoclave display. The idea was to split up the secondary side just after the con-
denser and start in the left side of the display with the preheating system fol-
lowed by the steam generators, the turbines and finally the condenser. The pri-
mary system is placed as shown in Figure 33.  
 
 
Figure 33 Overview display for a PWR, 1. draft 
 
The curves show the temperatures, the pressures, the saturation pressures and 
the flows of the primary, the secondary and the tertiary loop of the plant. The 
tertiary loop is the cooling loop for the condenser e.g. seawater loop or water 
from a cooling tower. The polygon consists of straight lines connecting the 
points in the coordinate system representing the values of the measured parame-
ters. The position of the connecting points of the curves is vertically correlated 
to the mimic diagram and the position of the sensors in question. Only vertical 
movements of the polygons can take place. 
When the draft was presented to the operators, they were not enthusiastic. It 
looked quite different from what they were used to. For example, they thought 
that the preheating system should be placed below the turbine system, as it had 
been up to then. This is shown on the mimic diagrams on Figure 34, which is 
the conventional mimic diagram of a simulator and on the simplified diagram 
on Figure 35.  
The display systems were developed in the framework of a simulated PWR 
plant, originally made as a model of the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, 
Larsen [18]; the model had been used in connection with the Multi Level Flow 
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 Model, Lind [21] for a series of experiments the purpose of which was to find 
out how the incident at the Three Mile Island plant could have been prevented if 
it had been equipped with better display systems, Prætorius [38], as described in 
Chapter 2.  
 
Figure 34 Mimic diagram of the PWR simulator 
 In the second draft of the display system, the systems were placed as the opera-
tors were used to, with the primary system to the left and the secondary system 
to the right, as in Figure 35. To avoid confusion about which part of the curves 
belongs to the pre-heater system and which to the turbine system, the pre-heater 
curves are drawn as a dotted line in the same colour as the curve through the 
turbine side. 
 
 
Figure 35 Overview display,  draft 2 
 
For the second draft, it was decided that it should be implemented on a full-
scale PWR simulator, to show, as also was the case for the first draft, the meas-
ured parameters and others that can be calculated from them. For example, the 
saturation pressure in the reactor is calculated from the temperature and shown 
on the display, with a yellow line indicating the lower limit for the pressure, 
which means that the pressure margin is always present for the operator.  
The reason why it was decided not to show estimated values is that these, for 
example the flow through turbines (not measured) which should equal the feed 
water flow (measured), are reliable only in normal situation, while they can be 
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misleading in case of an abnormal event, for example a pipe rupture before the 
turbines. But the most important challenge of the display system is precisely 
that it should conceive an abnormal event and make the operator aware of it. 
One problem about using polygons to show the measured variables is that 
there are more than one train in the pre-heater system, the steam generator sys-
tem and the turbine system in a real plant. The small simulator used for draft 1 
and 2 have only one train, both for pre-heating, steam generation and for the 
turbine system. To separate the trains the polygons are displaced from each 
other at a distance of 5 pixels in horizontal direction, to make it clear which 
train deviates from the others in an event situation. One polygon represents the 
steady state condition, so it is possible to see deviations from the intended con-
dition as well.  
The levels of the pressuriser, the steam generators, the feed water tanks and 
the condensers are shown as levels in the mimic diagram. The same method is 
used for levels as for the polygons described above, with the levels placed be-
side each other in such a way that it is possible to see the levels in the four-
steam generator and a reference level too. The small simulator has only two 
generators and therefore only two levels are presented.  If a level starts to in-
crease, an up-arrow is shown for the level in question, and similarly a decreas-
ing level is indicated by a down-arrow so that the operator is made aware that 
the situation is changing. Key values of the parameters are shown digitally too 
in the mimic diagram, as tradition has it: at the point where the values are meas-
ured. 
4.2.1 The control system 
The control system is interesting both for the diagnosis of an event and for 
maintenance purposes. As discussed earlier, the control system has a tendency 
of hiding incipient failures, so the observation of the activity in the control sys-
tem could be a way to reveal such failures. Similarly, the control system com-
pensates for the effect of wear in components. In both cases the plant functions 
are still normal, but the condition of the plant has changed. Actions in the con-
trol system are shown in the overview display in the same way as changes in the 
water levels. If the control system speeds up a pump, an up-arrow is shown in a 
box beside the pump in the mimic diagram. This idea was adapted from Præto-
rius [38] in Figure 35 . The display implemented on the full-scale simulator is 
shown below. This display still suffers from the lack of a lower limit for the 
pressure in the reactor and the arrows at the controllers. A special problem 
about the display is: how should the pumps be presented as components, and 
how should their status be shown. Letting each pump correspond to an arrow in 
the display solved the problem: when the pump is running the arrow is white, 
and when it is idle the arrow is grey. White and grey are the colours that were 
chosen in the full-scale simulator for components operating, respectively not 
operating. Incidentally, to register the status of a component can be a task in 
itself; for example, that the power has been switched on to open a magnetic 
valve is not the same as to say that the valve is in fact open. 
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Figure 36 Final Display for the PWR full scale simulator 
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 4.3 Evaluation of the design 
The PWR overview display was designed with a view to the display for the 
pipe reactor: the idea was to try out if the way the measured variables were pre-
sented for the pipe reactor could be applicable and valuable in the case of a nu-
clear reactor too. 
At the time the PWR display was developed, it was not intended to fulfil all 
the requirements to a display. The aim was merely to show the measured vari-
ables not just digitally but also in other ways. To evaluate the design and esti-
mate its ability to fulfil the requirements will be valuable for further work. It 
should be added that it is not the purpose of an overview display to fulfil all 
requirements for an entire system. 
 
The information required in the overview display was the following: 
 
• Layout of the plant 
• Types of components 
• Goals of the plant  
• Functions of the plant  
• Reference values included for both goals and functions. 
• Important safety requirements  
 
The requirements for an overview display must focus on the main systems and 
the main components.  
4.3.1 Layout and components 
The layout follows the layout used for piping and instrumentation diagrams (PI-
diagrams) for this type of plant, unless that the symbols for the pumps do not 
follow symbols, which are used for PI diagrams and only the main pipes and 
components are present.  
4.3.2 Goals of the plant 
The overall goal of the plant is to produce a specified amount of power in a 
safe way. This goal does not appear in the overview display. One way to repre-
sent the goal would be to show it as an energy flow through the entire plant; 
however the energy flow through the turbine system cannot be calculated from 
measured variables, since the flow on the steam side is normally not measured. 
Still, the power output must of course be shown on the screen, and so must the 
reactor power and the overall efficiency: they are among the key parameters. 
The efficiency can change from day to night due to the cooling water tempera-
ture, but even then it is an indicator, e.g. for condenser problems. 
4.3.3 Functions of the plant 
The functions of the plant are: temperature, flow and pressure increases and 
decreases. They are all presented in the overview display whereas the refer-
ences, that is, the set points for power and other quantities, are not presented. 
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 4.3.4 Condition of the plant 
There is no presentation of conditions of the plant in the overview display be-
cause this is not the purpose of an overview display. However, a quantity such 
as the difference (or the ratio) between actual and expected efficiency of the 
plant is an overall indicator of its condition, and it might be appropriate to in-
clude this quantity in the overview display. 
4.3.5 Safety 
When the pipe reactor display was designed we knew the safety problems in-
herent in the plant, and what to be aware of during operation. Now, when we are 
addressing the problem of providing information related to safety on a PWR, 
the following questions must be answered: 
 
- What are the safety problems of the plant? 
- Which situations must be avoided? 
- How can these situations occur? 
- How can these situations be identified/recognized? 
 
As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, there are at least two main 
safety problems when trying to avoid any risk of a core melt down in a PWR: 
(1) to keep the secondary system able to remove the heat from the primary sys-
tem (for this task, the temperature difference between the primary and the sec-
ondary side is an important safety parameter);  (2) to prevent boiling in the pri-
mary system. 
 
Both these problems can be managed in the present overview display. The 
temperature difference between the primary and the secondary system can eas-
ily be checked,  Figure 37. It is also easy to see if the primary pressure is higher 
than saturation pressure. 
 
      Temperature difference 
                                                           
 
 
 
 
Primary side temperatures      Secondary side temperatures 
 
Figure 37 Temperature difference primary-secondary 
 
The unwanted situations are caused by leaks and failures of pumps. In both 
situations, the control system tries to compensate for the leak or the failure. The 
implemented supervision of the activity in the control system, makes it possible 
to follow compensatory actions. The idea was tested first on the small-scale 
simulator; the test pointed to up- and down-arrows to represent actuator activi-
ties as being valuable in the overview display and even in lower level displays.  
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4.4 Tests of the overview display  
The first tests of the PWR overview display were performed on the-small 
scale simulator during the development of the display. Next, a series of three 
tests were made on the full-scale simulator at the Halden Reactor Project, Nor-
way, in order to see how the display would behave during different transients. 
The full-scale simulator models the reactor at the nuclear power plant in 
Loviisa, Finland.  
The overview display was implemented at the Loviisa simulator according to 
the design rules that have been followed in all other displays at this simulator: 
rules for how to represent open/close valves, which symbols to use for pumps, 
which colours to use etc. We shall now give a brief account of the three tests 
made at the Loviisa full-scale simulator. 
 
Test no. 1  –  Trip of one turbine 
 
Observations.  The first observation on the display after the trip was a drop of 
mass flow before the low-pressure heaters. This means that the condenser 
pumps are running but the flow is by-passed back to the condenser. The flow in 
the condenser pumps is maintained. –  It was rather easy to follow the steps in 
the automatic regulation of the flow into a stable operation with one turbine 
train. 
 
What to be done.  The curves need to be supplemented with references. It 
should be easier to see if a curve has moved up or down: small changes are 
hardly observed without some kind of reference curve. On the other hand, the 
pressure and the temperature distribution across the tripped turbine train have 
no interest, and parts, which are not in operation should not be represented. 
 
Test no. 2  –  Leak  in the high pressure heat exchanger 
 Another not un-normal event is a leak in one of the high-pressure pre-heaters. 
There are two types of leak: a leak in the plate between the inlet chamber and 
the outlet chamber and a leak in a pipe between the primary and secondary side 
of the heat exchanger. Test no. 2 was a leak in a pipe. 
 
Observations.  This leak could not be observed with the present measured pa-
rameters. 
 
What to be done.  There is a need to present additional measurements on the 
display. 
 
Test no. 3  –  Leakage in a steam generator from the primary to the secondary 
side 
 
Observations.  The level in the pressuriser goes down. The charging pumps 
are activated. The valve on the feed-water control on the secondary side starts to 
decrease the feed-water flow. 
 
What to be done.  Again, some reference curves or points would be appropri-
ate because they would make it easier to observe a change in flow, a tempera-
ture or a pressure.  
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 4.5 Conclusions from the tests 
Experience from running various events on the simulators using the new 
overview display yielded valuable information about the dynamics of the plant 
and about the sensitivity of the measured parameters to the events in question. 
A quantity which turned out to react quite slowly and with delay to an event is 
the temperature. In contrast, the flow reacts almost immediately. This difference 
in behaviour is hardly a surprise since the temperature in the system must de-
pend on the temperature of the structure material and is in fact often a secondary 
effect of a change in flow. Paulsen et al.[31](It can be added that the control 
system acts very fast on an event too, and again this is of course not a surprise.) 
Even in case the flow stops completely, the temperature remains almost the 
same for a rather long time. This is explained by the fact that the main actuators 
in the control system are the pumps and the valves. A stop of a pump or the 
closing of a valve causes an immediate stop of the flow; just a decrease in pump 
speed or a partial closing of a valve has an effect on the flow at once, but does 
not influence the temperature before much later. Such observations are useful 
for future work on specifying which parameters must be shown in the overview 
display in order to make the operator aware of incipient failures. This kind of 
information also indicates which parameters should be alert and which may be 
kept more in the background. 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the three tests of events at the 
full-scale simulator using configurable displays: 
• In case the feed flow is disturbed, as was the case for the turbine trip 
and the leak in the steam generator, the configural displays shows the 
event very well and the operator can quickly observe that something 
has changed.  
• A leak in the pre-heater is not observable. Such a leak can be detected 
by checking the valve that controls the water level in the pre-heater. 
Some events require a study, preferably an FMEA analysis, of failure 
modes and their consequences. 
• By some of the events the polygons totally overlap each other Figure 
38 and Figure 39,, and this leads to a confusion when trying to under-
stand what is going on.  
Figure 38 After a scram- overlapping polygons 
 
 
 
  Risø-PhD-8(EN) 62
 
Or a normal situation 
 
Figure 39 Plant at half power- also overlapping polygons 
• In case of a failed sensor the situation is the same: the polygon will be 
confusing and not helpful Figure 40.  
 
 
Figure 40 Sensor failure in the pipe reactor 
 
The last three pictures show the weakness of Configural displays. If more than 
one type of variables are shown on the same display they can in specific situa-
tions overlap each other and the display will be confusing. A sensor failure dis-
turb the picture a can make the display nearly useless. Concerning the up and 
down arrows on the small simulator, a wish for a future display is to make it 
visible from where controller has its input. Could be done by dotted lines on the 
mimic diagram.  
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5. Design of an Overview Display for 
a Waste Incineration Plant 
During an EU project (CLEAN) with the main goal to reduce the emission 
from waste incineration plants, it became appropriate to take up the challenge of 
developing an overview display for such a plant, see Paulsen and Weber [36] 
To achieve the goal of the project and indicate practicable ways to reduce the 
emission, it was attempted to optimise the control system. For this task, a neural 
net controller was constructed based on experience from a particular plant. The 
overview display was developed in order to test the neural network controller; 
besides it would be useful for the training of the operators.  
Waste incineration plants present a very interesting problem compared to other 
energy producing plants, viz. that the operator does not know in advance what the 
burning value and the moisture content of the waste is. This is why solely adjusting 
the airflow cannot control the burning process; the operator also has to make a vis-
ual inspection of the burning process.  
The operator should be considered part of the control system. The information to 
the operator about the plant status must be very precise so that he is able at any 
time to take the right decision about which actions he should carry out. This fea-
ture of the plant makes certain claims to the selection of information to the opera-
tor, and to the way it is presented. 
5.1 Description of a waste incineration plant   
The purpose of a waste incineration plant is, simply, to get rid of the waste. In 
most plants the energy produced by the incineration is utilised directly for do-
mestic heating, but in some cases also for the production of electricity.   
 
Figure 41 Waste incineration plant. 1.generation display 
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 Waste, of mixed domestic and industrial origin, is delivered to the plant by 
road transport and unloaded into a waste pit; the pit is usually sized for a capac-
ity of several days in order to guarantee a continuous treatment of the waste, 
regardless of possible fluctuations in delivery. Specially designed waste cranes 
feed the incinerator.  
The incineration of the waste takes place on a stoker type grate. The slag’s 
produced during this treatment are removed through a slag quench tank and an 
extractor placed underneath the grate. The boiler located above the grate pro-
duces live steam by cooling the flue gas from an initial temperature of at least 
850°C down to about 230°C at the boiler outlet. 
To get an efficient burnout, it is necessary that during the start-up phase the 
minimum temperature of the flue gas in the post combustion zone is 850°C, 
even when taking the temperature fluctuations at normal operation into regard. 
In order to ensure this, start up and/or support burners are installed. 
Part of the combustion air is drawn from the waste pit, preheated and injected 
through the grate and the waste layer into the combustion chamber (primary 
air). Additional air is drawn above the slag extractor and injected into the com-
bustion chamber above the grate (secondary air), in order to achieve a complete 
post-combustion of the flue gas.  
The steam produced in the boiler proceeds to a condensing turbine, which is 
used for the generation of electric power.  
A flue gas cleaning is performed before the gases are released into the atmos-
phere.  
5.2 The information required for building the 
display 
What is an optimal process? First of all, the requirements for the process to be 
optimal must be known; and so must the problems during normal operation as 
well as the risks connected to the process and the plant 
A simple strategy based on some questions used in risk analysis work was 
used to extract the information to display to the operator:  
 
• What is the goal? 
• What is the problem? 
• Why does it occur? 
• How is it observed? 
• How to control it 
• How to present it 
 
Addressing these questions leads to an identification of the relevant process 
variables to present to the operator.  
Typical problems in the project dealt with here is the emission of unwanted 
elements in the crude gas, for example a too high levels of carbon monoxide 
and of dioxin. These problems can be avoided by maintaining a sufficiently 
high temperature in the incineration chamber and a sufficient airflow to the in-
cineration process. 
Due to the considerable variation in humidity and heating value of the waste, 
it is difficult to estimate the necessary airflow. The optimal way of running the 
process is to keep the energy output constant corresponding to a constant flow 
of steam, but this is difficult to realise because of the variation in heating value 
of the waste input. The same strategy as described above – asking why, what to 
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observe, and what to do – can be used to analyse the problem of deviation from 
normal energy output:  
 
 
Using the strategy 
 
QUESTION  EXAMPLE  
What is the 
goal? 
→ Minimise release products 
What is the 
problem? 
→ Incomplete burnout of waste 
Why does it 
occur? 
→ Variation in characteristics of input waste (burning 
value and humidity) 
Too low temperature in the second incineration cham-
ber. 
Problems with the waste distribution on the grate 
How is it ob-
served? 
→ Unstable steam production 
 CO and O2 levels in the flue gas are increasing or 
decreasing. Values below or above limits for accept-
able operation. 
The temperature in secondary chamber is lower that 
set-point, Tsec <Tset 
How to con-
trol it 
→ Change the amount of input waste, primary air, sec-
ondary air, grid speed, or the preheating  
How to pre-
sent it 
→ Depends on what to observe. A mixture of different 
presentation forms as trend curves, graphical represen-
tation of process variables and video of the drying and 
burning zones will be used. 
Table 4 The analysis 
 
Figure 42 shows the resulting overview display, with the various types of in-
formation it was decided to have on it. 
 
 
 
Figure 42 Overview display for a waste incineration plant, 3. generation 
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 The production goal of the plant has been set to a production of 25 ton of 
steam per hour. Since it is important to take measures against variation in steam 
flow, the steam production is shown in the display as a trend curve. Another 
problem, a possibly incomplete incineration, appears from the O2 and the CO 
content in the flue gas; therefore they are presented as trend curves too, as for 
the steam production to be aware of the tendencies in the variation. 
An uneven distribution of waste on the grid can, to some degree, be detected 
by observing the wall temperatures along the grid. These temperatures are 
shown on two vertical axes representing the walls. A line connects the two tem-
peratures, making it easier to see a deviation from optimal function, which 
would mean the same temperature at the same position on both sides, that is, a 
horizontal line. 
The middle part of the display informs about the grate: the grate velocity in % 
of maximal velocity; the openings of the primary air throttle valves; the tem-
perature of the primary air; and control bars for manual control of the grate ve-
locity and air throttle valve openings. 
In the middle to the right, three important temperatures are shown: the flue 
gas temperature in the second incineration chamber T1 supplemented with the 
set point value (the horizontal line); the temperature before the flue gas cleaning 
system T2; and the exhaust temperature T3. The three temperatures are con-
nected with lines to observe changes better. This line also shows the tempera-
ture drop in the boiler, T1-T2, corresponding to the energy delivered to the dis-
trict heating system. A decrease in the temperature drop across the boiler will 
indicate scaling problems on the heat transmission surfaces in the boiler. 
On the display is also made room for real-time presentation of the pictures 
from two video cameras, one showing an image from the upper grid to super-
vise what is coming in of waste, the other an image from the lower grid with 
information of e.g. unburned waste 
In the upper left corner is a graph showing the Humidity Value Correction. 
The operator can adjust the humidity in the incineration chamber if he finds that 
the humidity and thereby the burning value of the waste has changed. The crane 
operator keeps the operator informed about the type of waste he is loading into 
the system; from this and other information the operator estimates the humidity 
value. 
As it can be seen in the figure, almost all the variables are presented in a 
graphical form, making it easier for the operator to see if the operation of the 
plant is normal or a deviation is occurring. 
 
5.2.1 Test of the display 
During the initial implementation of the neural network controller, the operator 
is regarded as part of the controller. The operator has to perform the actions manu-
ally that the controller, after it has been finally implemented, will carry out auto-
matically. The initial implementation is therefore a test of the neural network con-
troller. The display must present, besides the information about plant condition, 
advice to the operator about manual adjustment of set points 
The neural network controller has been tested at a incineration plant in Darm-
stadt, using the display we have developed. The display turned out to be able to 
supply all the graphical information required. The neural network control part 
was not fully finished at that time. 
During the test, the steam production suddenly and unintentionally decreased 
to a level much below what was normal during steady state operation. The nor-
mal production would vary between 20 to 30 ton/hour; this rather high variation 
was caused by the changing burning value of the input, and it was the main rea-
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son why the management wanted to optimise the control system. The operator 
discovered the decrease while he was looking at the new display; clearly he was 
sceptical and thought that there has to be something wrong with what it showed. 
He went to the traditional Siemens display system, Figure 43, and looked at a 
lot of screens whereby he found out that the grate has stopped to move. The in-
teresting thing is that all the variables he was looking for were present in the 
new display: it was rather easy to see in this new display – on one screen – what 
had happened, and the consequences of the event were. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 43 Second generation displays 
 
The incident reported here is not claimed to be a proof that the system described 
above fulfils all requirements to an optimal overview display. Still, it seems to 
extract the essential key parameters, and it does so by utilising the philosophy in 
risk analysis thinking. The simple strategy that was applied has proved to facili-
tate the elicitation of the sub-goals necessary for the goal to be fulfilled 
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6. Condition Monitoring of a Power 
Plant Condenser 
This chapter deals with the development of displays to be used for power 
plants. One specific system is studied as an example: a condenser system. The 
condenser is of particular interest because it has an impact on the economy of 
thermal power plants, and it was a wish at several plants to install condition 
monitoring which could give an early indication of problems in the condenser 
and, if possible, information about the type of problem that had occurred. 
6.1  Description of a Condenser 
The performance of the condenser system is essential for the efficiency of the 
power generation and thereby for the overall economy of the power production. 
The condenser has as its main purpose to keep the pressure as low as possible 
on the secondary side of the low-pressure turbine. Its operation influences di-
rectly the plant efficiency, because the efficiency of the plant depends on the 
quantity Pturb/Pcond, that is, the ratio between the pressures before and after the 
turbine. A cooling system is used to condense the steam and to keep the tem-
perature, and thereby the pressure in the condenser, as low as possible. An ejec-
tor system removes the non-condensable gases from the condenser. Distur-
bances and degradations in these two systems influence the pressure in the con-
denser.   
The condenser is also used for other purposes: to receive dump of steam, 
drainage, re-circulation from condenser pumps etc.[28]. These systems have a 
connection to the condenser and therefore they may influence the pressure in the 
condenser. 
 
Steam from turbine
  Ejectors P
Dump T
   Rec. FW  T
Drain, vacuum breakers e.g.
Cooling Water PT
 
Figure 44 Condenser system 
To illustrate the influence of variation in pressure, a measured dependency  
between generator power and condenser pressure at the Barsebäck Nuclear 
Power Plant is shown in Figure 45. It illustrates the variation from January to 
August 1997 due to the increase in seawater temperature. The corresponding 
increase in pressure leads to a decrease in generator power of 50Mw, from 617 
Mw to 567 Mw. 
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 Figure 45 The Influence of Condenser Pressure on Generator Power. 
The change in the sea-water temperature is a natural phenomenon and nothing 
can be done about that. But the same consequence results from failures in the 
systems that are connected to the condenser and exert an influence on the pres-
sure in the condenser. This is why power companies are interested in condenser 
behaviour. 
6.2 The simple strategy applied to the condenser 
An account of how the strategy is applied to the condenser system is pre-
sented in Table 5. 
Table 5 : Strategy Applied to a Condenser. 
QUESTIONS 
 
Answers Information 
to show 
References 
What is the purpose of 
the display ? 
To distinguish between the different 
failure modes in the condenser that 
gives increased pressure. 
  
What is the problem? 
 
Temperature increase in the condenser 
Non-condensable gasses in condenser 
Tcond 
Tcooling 
Pcond 
Tcond expected 
Pcond = f(Tcond) 
How does the problem 
occur? 
Ejector problems 
Cooling problems 
Incoming air 
Fission gasses 
  
How is the problem ob-
served? 
 
Decrease in expected power 
Increase in condenser pressure 
Increase in air flow from ejector 
Power 
Pcond 
Flow-air 
Expected power 
Invariants and physical 
laws in the process? 
 
The condition is saturated steam => 
Working point on the steam saturation 
curve 
Daltons law P=Pa+Pb+…+Pn (sum of 
partial pressures) 
Saturation 
curve and 
working point 
Pmeas 
Expected working 
point on satura-
tion curve 
Psat 
Design parameters? ∆T= Tcondenser-Tcooling water  
= constant at normal operation 
∆T  
Characteristics? Saturation curve Saturation 
curve 
 
Specific properties?    
How to present the prob-
lem? 
Actual working point and expected 
working point relative to the steam 
saturation curve 
Trend curves for Tsea,Tcond, Pcond, 
Psat… 
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The information identified from applying the strategy described above is nec-
essary when designing a display for efficient condition monitoring of a con-
denser. This is explained in the following. 
 
The purpose of the display is to inform the operator about the condition of the 
condenser and to assist him in distinguishing between different failures in the 
condenser, especially failures that lead to an increased pressure. 
As described above, the condenser pressure depends on the temperature in the 
condenser and thereby on the coolant water temperature. The lower the pres-
sure, the better is the economy for the power plant. A change in pressure leads 
to a change in generated power; the latter is often observed first. A change in 
generated power can happen due to a change in the condenser, or to other 
changes in the plant. If the change in power were due to a change in the con-
denser performance it would be advantageous to look at the generated power 
and pressure as function of time in the same diagram. In this way deviation of 
pressure from a constant value can be observed as a cause to decreased produc-
tion.  As the naturally change in cooling water temperature can be the cause to 
the increase in condenser pressure, the cooling water temperature value must be 
present as a trend curve too. At the Barsebäck nuclear power plant, small fluc-
tuations also occur in the condenser temperature due to addition to the system of 
fresh water with a temperature lower than the one in the condenser.  
In general, one of the design parameters is the temperature difference be-
tween the coolant water and the condenser. The expected pressure in the con-
denser can be calculated as a function of the coolant temperature, and the work-
ing point can be plotted on the characteristic, i.e., the steam saturated curve, 
which is to be considered an invariant for the condenser performance. When the 
measured working point is plotted in the diagram too, it is easy to see the devia-
tion from the expected working point.    
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Figure 46 Display for condition monitoring of a Condenser. 
T sea water
 
The display developed for the condenser is shown in Figure 46. The purpose 
of the display is to indicate deviations of the actual working point of the con-
denser from the expected working point; besides the display should be able to 
show which type of degradation or failure that has occurred. 
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 Cooling problems and fouling on the heat transmission surfaces cause an in-
crease in the condenser temperature and thereby in the pressure, but the working 
point will still lie on the saturation curve. Non-condensable gases are expected 
to increase the pressure in such a way that the working point moves up above 
the saturation curve, but the gases also give rise to an increase in temperature 
due to a decrease in heat transmission. 
Fouling on the heat transmission surfaces is expected to increase the pressure 
in the condenser more slowly than is the case when a failure has happened in 
the ejector system, or when leaks of air have entered into the condenser. Tests at 
a Danish power plant where the ejector system was stopped for half an hour 
showed a fast increase in pressure due to the formation of non-condensable 
gases. The present display has therefore importance for the maintenance plan-
ning of the condenser and for optimisation of the thermal performance of the 
entire plant.  
The display has been implemented for tests at the HAMBO simulator at the 
Halden Reactor Project. The idea of involving the component characteristics is 
also used for condition monitoring of other types of components in the ongoing 
Halden reactor Project. Tests of the displays will show if this type of presenta-
tion is well understood by the operators and if it is sensitive enough to be able 
to observe incipient failures. Replaying data from Barsebäck has given promis-
ing results, Figure 47 
The display developed for the condenser must be supported by trend curves 
for the relevant variables. 
6.3 Test of the Condenser Display 
The condenser display was implemented on a PC to test its functionality. The 
programming language used for this demo was Visual Basic. The display was 
used for replaying data from two thermal power plants, one nuclear and one gas 
fired, and data from the HAMBO simulator. 
From the nuclear power plant, both data for a cold winter period and data for a 
hot summer period were replayed, Figure 47. The operation was performed with 
a constant reactor power and it showed a difference in generator effect between 
the winter and the summer period of nearly 60 MW, due to the difference in 
cooling water temperature. The working point remained on the saturation curve,  
 
Summer
Winter
Pressure
Temperature
 
Figure 47 Replay of Data from Barsebäck 
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The display was implemented on the HAMBO simulator and three tests were 
made, one simulating an air leakage into the condenser, one with a stop of a 
main cooling pump and one with a stop of the ejector system; the latter event 
might have similar consequence as fouling on the heat transmission surfaces. 
Both tests are shown on Figure 48. 
 
 
Pressure in mbar
Temp. in condenser
Leak of air
Pump stop
Ejector stop
Figure 48 Test on HAMBO of the Condenser Display. 
In general, the results of the tests were as expected. In the case of an air leak 
into the condenser, the working point of the condenser deviates from the satura-
tion curve, showing a pressure higher than at saturation. This points to other 
gases than just steam having been introduced into the condenser. In the case of a 
pump stop the working point is expected to end up on the saturation curve after 
the system has stabilised; it seems to be exactly what happens. 
The condenser display can be supplemented with the curve that shows the ef-
fect of variation in the condenser pressure on the generator power. The result 
would look similar to the Figure 49 display replayed with data from the pump 
stop on the HAMBO simulator. 
The display shown on Figure 49 is a combination of two characteristics for 
the plant. The one to the left is the curve showing the generator effect as func-
tion of the condenser pressure, but with the pressure shown on the y-axis and 
the effect on the x-axis. The one to the right is the same as for the condenser 
display also with the pressure as the y-axis. 
• The working point of the condenser (T,P) is plotted into the right side 
display 
• A horizontal line is drawn to the characteristic in the left side display. 
• The x- value is then the generator effect 
• Eventual loss in effect due to increased pressure in the condenser can 
be observed from the x-axis of the left display as seen on the figure. 
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Figure 49: A Combined Display Showing the Consequences of a Pressure In-
crease in the Condenser. 
 
Figure 50 The same display, but with an air leak ( new version of the display) 
The test was performed in the mode with a constant reactor power. In the case 
of constant generator power the consequences of an increasing condenser pres-
sure would be an increasing reactor power, while a control system will increase 
the reactor power to compensate for the decreased generator power of the plant. 
The efficiency will decrease as for the constant reactor power mode. 
 
The condenser display showed that the display fulfilled its purpose namely to 
distinguish between the different failure modes for the condenser. Furthermore 
also the influence of the effect of the plant can be seen. 
Certainly other information can be put into the present display, but the task 
was just to show, that there is a difference in behaviour of the condenser, de-
pendent of which situation that occur.  
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7. Systems Analysis 
Lessons learned from the guidelines, state of the art on design of displays and 
own experiences are that the designer must have a deep knowledge of the plant 
and its functions to be able to assess which information is necessary for the op-
erator. It both concerns the normal functions and safety aspects of the plant. 
How do the designer get this knowledge? A comprehensive and structured sys-
tems analysis may give the designer the required knowledge. This chapter de-
scribes how knowledge about the plant originates from different sources and/or 
analysis. The content of the chapter can be summarized as follows. 
We set out with a brief discussion of the design specifications for the plant 
and its control system, but the item that is treated most thoroughly is risk analy-
sis, including aspects such as hazard identification, root cause identification and 
human errors.  
7.1 Plant design 
During the initial design of a process plant for making a specified product, the 
decisions are taken on how to carry out the production. Usually this can be done 
in more than one way. For example, in the case of a nuclear power plant, one 
may choose between a large numbers of reactor types. Similarly, in chemical 
plants there are different methods to make the same product, and for each 
method there may even be different components to choose among in the design 
of the whole plant. 
For the designer of the information system it could be valuable to have access 
to information from this stage of the design process, in particular to the argu-
ments for choosing a specific process among the various possibilities. Of course 
not all arguments are relevant in this connection; for example an argument for 
reasons of prize is not as valid as an argument for safety reasons. Still, the vari-
ous arguments have been intertwined in the initial decision process. To inform 
the designer about these arguments is to enable him better to understand the 
problems connected to the process – to realise what to be aware of, and what to 
avoid with the chosen process. Likewise it could be informative to know the 
reasons for the choice of components: why was a specific component selected 
from a set of various possible ones? Here, too, the economic aspects are not as 
interesting as the positive and negative functional aspects involved in the choice 
of a component. It could have been decisive that the component had a specific 
characteristic, which would fit to the process; but it could also have been safety 
reasons that closed the matter, for example the wish to use redundant systems. 
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 The following flow diagram, Figure 51, gives very short some of the ques-
tions asked when designing a plant. 
 
 
 
Goal of the  plant
-What to produce
- Capacity
How to produce  the  product?
-Choice of method
-Risks of the method
 
Choice  of compone nts
-Types
-Size
Control of the  production
-Risks in the production
-Other limits
Figure 51 Simplified flow diagram of a design process 
7.2 Design of the Control System 
The purpose of the control system is to ensure that the intended operating 
goals of the plant are met. And there are goals at all levels of the plant: to keep 
up production is a goal; to keep a certain water level in a tank is a goal, too, al-
though at a lower level. As a consequence, the control system must supervise 
different goals of the plant and react to deviations from them. 
One important operating goal is to ascertain the protection of the process and 
the plant. Protection of the process means for example to a chemical production 
process below a certain temperature, to prevent the product from being ruined. 
The control system should react to e.g. deviations from the normal operation 
temperature, and maintain the temperature within given limits. 
Protection of the components, means for example to ensure liquid at a certain 
pressure on the suction side a pump to prevent it from breaking down. Then it is 
a task for the control system to assure that liquid is at hand where it should be, 
for example by keeping a certain level of liquid in a tank on the suction side of 
the pump. 
Protection of the process and the plant itself can give rise to the installation of 
interlocks. The demand to do so can also result from a risk analysis of the pro-
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duction process. Included in the specifications of the control system, besides 
information of operating goals to achieve and problems to avoid in normal con-
ditions, also information about possible interlocks should appear. The installa-
tion of interlocks is sometimes necessary, e.g., to prevent human errors, but in-
terlocks also restrict the possibilities to rearrange the process in an emergency 
situation where the absence of the interlocks might have been more convenient. 
As, by nature, the control system tends to hide incipient failures, a supervision 
of the actions of the control system would be informative for the operator. He is 
himself a part of the control system. Therefore, when deciding how to design 
the control system, one of the important questions is: what must be automati-
cally controlled, and what the operator must control? 
 
In safety critical plants and in complex plants the automation level is very 
high. However during emergency conditions, a number of operations are still 
based on manual control. For nuclear power plants, it has been decided that the 
operator should control certain situations. In these cases the operator makes use 
of Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP), as a source of advise about his 
tasks and decisions during abnormal conditions. This practice resulted from the 
possibility of an unforeseen event that might cause difficulties for the control 
system to function as intended. Using his general process insight, an operator 
would probably have a better possibility to cope with the situation. 
Conclusively and in brief, the purpose of the information system is to support 
the operator in his tasks during normal operation, but especially in emergency 
situations. 
7.3 Sensor analysis 
There is only one source from which dynamic information about the plant can 
be extracted for use in display systems: the sensors. These are placed in the 
plant for different reasons: 
• To perform automatic control of the plant and its processes, it is nec-
essary to install sensors at a number of different places in the plant.  
• Similarly, to ensure sufficient supervision of the goals of the plant, of 
the plant behaviour, of its safety and its processes, it is necessary to 
install sensors in the process. 
• Finally, requirements from the authorities can give rise to further sen-
sors. For example, it may be necessary to supervise the pressure in 
tanks and to control the content of exhaust gases. 
 
 
 
Control Production Safety   Behaviour Condition 
 
 
 
Sensor information 
 
 
 
 
Sensors 
Figure 52 Purposes for the sensors installed in a process plant
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A sensor analysis is a description of the purpose of each sensor in the system 
in question. The aim of the study is to support the design of the information sys-
tem on how to show the information that has been collected. The following ex-
amples illustrate the relevance of such a study. 
• Suppose that a sensor is installed to show the temperature variation in 
the seawater. Obviously, it is more informative to show the tempera-
ture as a function of time than just to show it digitally, as is common 
today. 
• In the case of a sensor measuring the production of power, we have a 
somewhat different situation. It is obvious, and in most situations also 
sufficient, to present the instantaneous value; however for specific 
purposes a presentation of power output as a function of time may be 
relevant. Knowledge of a certain temperature in the pre-heating sys-
tem in a power plant is only useful if the temperature ‘before and af-
ter’ is indicated too, that is, one must be able to see if the temperature 
in the heat exchanger is going up or down; a stand-alone temperature 
yields little information because prediction is important for supervi-
sion. 
7.4 Risk Analysis 
A risk analysis is a structured examination of a system and its functions, with 
a view to identifying causes and consequences of unwanted events and thus to 
reducing risks by taking precautions. 
The risk analysis deals with selected emergency situations as well as with 
other unwanted events; and it provides information about the root causes for 
these events. In other words, the risk analysis points out the ‘hot spots’ in the 
plant and thereby gives input to the designer of the information system: what 
must the operator be aware of during operation of the plant? 
A further outcome of the risk analysis is that it identifies important sensors in 
the system. 
Carrying out a risk analysis requires the use of a number of systematic meth-
ods, each of them with different purposes. Among the most used methods are 
[37]: 
 
Functional modelling for risk analysis. 
Fault tree analysis 
Human error description. 
FMEA (Failure Mode and Effect Analysis) 
HAZOP Analysis (HAZard and OPerability) 
 
The five methods have different approaches: 
A common feature of Functional modelling and the HAZOP method is to 
identify the hazards that are consequences of faults in the plant.  
The Fault tree analysis considers these hazards as top events and finds the root 
causes for them. Using the fault tree method the probability of the top event can 
be calculated, if the failure rates for the root causes can be found. Fault tree 
analysis is used in probabilistic safety analysis where the probability of the top 
event is a part of decision criteria for safe operation of the plant.  
The FMEA focuses on failure modes of the single components; it analyses the 
consequences of these failure and identifies the root causes for them. 
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A more detailed description follows below.  
 
7.4.1 Functional modelling for risk analysis. 
Among different techniques for functional modelling we shall briefly describe 
a widely used technique based on SADT [7] ,Structured Analysis and Design 
Technique, and further developed in the EU-project Tomhid [39]. 
Functional modelling aims at identifying and assessing possible hazards or 
unwanted events. An identification of hazards can be made on the basis of a 
description of the different functions that are performed in the plant. 
The purpose of the functional model is to work out a sufficient description of 
the functional units of the plant, for example the stages of the process or proce-
dure, or the single operations. The model describes the operational and technical 
circumstances that are significant for the operation and the safety of the plant, 
resulting in a coherent description of human actions and technical processes. 
Use of the method implies that each unit is analysed by asking questions such 
as: 
What goes into the function? 
What comes out of the function? 
What is the aim of the function? 
What is done to implement the function? 
Which control functions are being contemplated, and why?   
 
    
What goes into 
the function
Implementation
Controls
What goes out of
the function   Function
  
Figure 53 SADT functional modelling concept 
 
When the functions of the plant have been identified, a checklist is applied to 
analyse the function. The checklist describes: 
 
The function in question 
The unwanted events of the function 
The possible consequence of a failing control function 
An assessment of the function, and of the possible precautionary measures, 
that should be taken. 
 
Function Unwanted event Consequences Control measures Assessment 
     
     
     
Table 6 Functional modelling checklist from the Tomhid project development 
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 7.4.2 Fault tree analysis 
A fault tree analysis is used when the unwanted events are already identified 
and there is a need to throw light on the logical connections between the causes 
of these events. The result of the analysis is presented in a fault-tree as shown in 
Figure 54 .The method is best explained and illustrated by giving an example.  
The method: 
 
Event
Cause1 Cause2 Cause3
Cause 1-1 Cause1-2
or
and
 
Figure 54 Fault tree structure 
Example: 
 
Loss of cooling
Pump failed Leak Lack of coolant
Mechanical
failure Electrical failure
or
 
Figure 55 Example on use of a fault tree 
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7.4.3 Human error description 
An analysis of human errors can reveal inappropriate elements in the proce-
dures and in the system that the operator must adjust. Furthermore the analysis 
can point to the consequences of human errors. 
In each specific situation, for example when analysing procedures, it is useful 
to compile a list containing the most common human failures that the risk ana-
lyst must be aware of.  
Human errors can be divided roughly into three main categories : 
 
• The operator fails to do what has been pre-scribed 
• The operator does what has been prescribed but does it incorrectly 
• The operator does something that has not been prescribed. 
 
Going slightly more in detail, one or more of the following labels may be at-
tached to the error: 
 
• Operation carried out incorrectly 
• Operation carried out correctly but at the wrong time 
• Unnecessary operation - not prescribed or not learnt by heart 
• Operation carried out correctly but on the wrong unit, system or com-
ponent 
• Operations carried out correctly but in the wrong order 
• Failing communication or misunderstanding. 
 
Finally, let us mention that “operator” is a broad term that can include such 
people as: 
• Control room operators 
• Operation staff  
• Maintenance staff. 
 
 
7.4.4 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)  
This type of risk analysis is used to reveal the consequences and the causes of 
failing components. In a table as seen in the example in Table 7 , the compo-
nents are listed. For each components its failure modes are listed, and for each 
failure mode the causes and consequences for the failure. The last column de-
scribes if actions have to betaken to prevent some of the failures or the conse-
quences of a failure. Below is an example for stop of a cooling pump. 
 
Component Failure mode Cause Consequence Actions 
Cooling pump Stops Electrical 
failure 
Lack of cooling None or 
should  
be examined 
     
 
Table 7 FMEA example 
 
 
 
Risø-PhD-8(EN)   83
 When carrying out an FMEA, it is convenient to have access to a list of possi-
ble component failures, Table 8. 
 
 
Control system  
Failure mode 
Pumps Do not start/stop 
Unintended start/stop 
Ageing 
Valves Do not open/close 
Unintended opening/closing 
Internal leakage 
Sensors 
 
Not correct measurement 
Transmitters No function 
Partly defect 
Heat elements Do not start /stop heating 
Unintended function 
Operators Human errors 
Passive systems  
Pipes Leaks 
Fouling 
Blocked/partly blocked 
Heat exchangers Internal/external leakage 
Fouling 
Safety valves Do not open/close 
Unintended opening 
Bursting disks Do not break 
Break unintended 
Table 8 Failure mode of different components 
 
7.4.5 Hazop analysis 
The Hazop analysis aims at identifying (1) the consequences of deviations in 
process variables, that is, pressure, temperature, flow, etc., and (2) the signifi-
cance of these consequences for the safety and the operation of the plant. The 
result of the analysis will appear in a table, exemplified in Table 9 
 
 
System Variable Deviation Cause Consequence Actions 
Cooling 
system 
Flow Too low Pump failure Insufficient 
cooling 
None or 
should be 
examined 
   Valve failure Insufficient 
cooling 
None or 
should be 
examined 
 
Table 9 Hazop analysis example 
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7.5 Which information is retrieved from the 
analysis and how can the information be used? 
The information obtained from the design process of the system itself and the 
control system should give the display designer knowledge about intended func-
tions of the plant. 
The information obtained from the risk analysis are the events that can happen 
in the process in question and the root causes for these events, both technical 
faults and human errors. Furthermore information on how the failures propagate 
through the system is obtained. The final display system must enable the opera-
tor to detect these failures. 
Even it is said that such an analysis will not find all failures, the analysis will 
give a deep understanding of the behaviour and functions in the process and 
what to take special care of during display design. In the theory all possible fail-
ures should be found in a risk analysis, but such an analysis must also from the 
beginning make some assumptions e.g. as not to include multiple failures. The 
analysis described should give a sufficient knowledge of the ‘perfect’ plant, but 
for old plants the operators experience must also be taken into account.   
The next chapter will discuss different references for the process, the compo-
nents and systems, which can be added to the designers “knowledge base”. 
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8. References for Functions and Con-
ditions 
In the design of display systems, one of the tasks is to find references or 
norms for normal operation. The main focus in the design is to facilitate moni-
toring of deviations caused by incipient failures so that they can be detected be-
fore the goals of the system are disturbed. Many incipient failures are hidden by 
compensatory control. An example is wear in a pump: if no control system were 
at hand, the wear would result in a decreased flow; however in case a control 
system has been installed including feed back control of the flow, the control 
system will increase the speed of the pump to compensate for the wear and keep 
the flow at the desired level. How are such failures observed? And which kind 
of references can be used? 
This chapter discusses different types of references to be used for observing 
deviations in processes and in equipment. Examples are given in order to illus-
trate the references and to suggest how they may be classified with respect to 
validity in different situations 
From the design phase, reference information concerning the component, the 
system and the medium can contribute to the information system. Deviations 
from normal operation and other failures can be observed as deviations from 
those specifications. This information originates (1) from the component char-
acteristics, (2) from the specific properties of the material, such as thermal con-
ductivity and specific weight, and (3) from physical laws, such as Dalton’s law 
for gases. The constraints express the laws of mass and energy conservation, the 
flow equations, the temperature and pressure dependencies for saturated steam 
and other relevant equations for the process and system in question. 
 
The references described in the following are: 
 
• Component characteristics 
• Design specifications 
• Material specific properties 
• Physical laws 
• Empirical rules and models 
• Limits for the process and the plant 
8.1.1 Component Characteristics 
Components such as pumps and valves have working characteristics, which 
give information about their function in different operating modes. A positive 
displacement pump Figure 56a has a linear characteristic, which means that the 
flow is proportional to the speed of the pump. A change of speed in a pump 
leads to a changed flow due to the operating characteristic. The characteristics 
for a centrifugal pump are a number of ‘parallel’ curves. Each curve corre-
sponds to one certain speed of the pump as show in Figure 56b. The characteris-
tic shows the dependency between the flow through of the pump and the pres-
sure increase across the pump.  
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 In designing a process plant, these characteristics are used to choose the right 
component for the desired use. 
 
P
Flow
a)Positive displacement pump b) Centrifugal pump 
Flow
Speed
Figure 56  a, b Examples of characteristics from two different pump. Also show-
ing the working points deviations from the pump characteristics 
The characteristic of the component does not change because of a change in 
operation mode of the plant, but the working point on the characteristic can 
move. 
If degradation takes place in a component, a deviation from its characteristic 
will result. The reason could be wear of the component, for example in the seat 
of a valve resulting in a higher flow through the valve than expected. Another 
example is leaking suction valves on a positive displacement pump, as de-
scribed for the pump display for the pipe autoclave. A leak will here result in a 
flow lower than expected at that specific speed of the pump, due to back flush 
through the suction valves. 
8.1.2 Design Specifications 
By design specifications we understand a specific working mode at normal 
working conditions. An example is a heat exchanger designed to maintain, at 
normal operation, a certain temperature difference between the primary and the 
secondary side at the terminals, and – more importantly – to transmit a certain 
amount of energy. 
Fouling on the heat transmission surfaces will increase the Terminal Tempera-
ture Difference (TTD) due to a decreased heat transmission coefficient; this in 
turn leads to a decrease in the efficiency of a heat exchanger which is specified 
during the design phase; and the expected efficiency can be used as a reference 
parameter. 
 
References 
Time 
TTD
Efficiency 
T1i
T2o
TTD = T1i-T2o
Figure 57 Heat exchanger.  The figure shows the terminals for measurement of 
the terminal temperature difference, TTD, and a trend curve with reference 
value for the TTD and efficiency e. 
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In a condenser, one of the design specifications is the temperature difference 
between the steam and the inlet liquid. The temperature difference is constant 
only at design conditions as is true for the TTD for heat exchangers. 
8.1.3 Material Specific Properties 
Specific properties are properties connected to materials, fluids and gases. Ex-
amples: specific weight, specific volume, specific heat, viscosity, thermal con-
ductivity, specific properties of water and steam. Whenever possible, these 
quantities can be calculated using measured thermodynamic state variables and 
can be compared with the expected properties acting as reference values. For 
instance, we could calculate the actual thermal conductivity for the material in a 
heat exchanger. In that situation, fouling could be detected by a decrease in the 
value of the expected conductivity. 
8.1.4 Physical Laws 
Examples of physical laws are: (1) the relation P = f(T)   between pressure 
and temperature for saturated steam,  (2) Dalton’s law. Let us recall the latter: 
Consider a container with mixture of gases, and denote by ‘partial presssure’ of 
a gas in the container the pressure that would be exerted by that gas if it were 
present alone; then the total pressure in the container equals the sum of the par-
tial pressures. Laws like these two are always valid, and they may serve as ref-
erences in systems where these laws are relevant for the process that takes 
place. 
Even if steam is not an ideal gas, the presence of other gases in a condenser 
can be observed by a pressure exceeding the pressure of the saturated steam: 
 
  Pcondenser  =  Psat + Pgas 
 
  P  =  P1 + P2 + ….. + Pn 
 
Additional examples of physical laws are the mass and energy conservation 
laws, Ohm’s law, the relation  V = R x I  between voltage, resistance and cur-
rant in an electrical circuit, and other laws from the theory of electricity e.g. 
Kirchhoff’s law. 
8.1.5 Empirical Rules and Models 
Empirical rules and models are ‘equations’ developed on the basis of experi-
ments and experience. An example is wear in a pipe leading to a decrease in the 
pressure drop across the pipe. This is a consequence of an increased pipe diame-
ter: the pressure drop is given by the formula 
 
  ∆p  =  λ*L*Q2*v2/D 
 
where: 
 λ is Fannings’ factor, a coefficient which depends on the roughness of the 
pipe, the viscosity of the fluid and Reynolds’ number. The Fannings’ factor is a 
factor based on experiments. 
L is the length of the pipe 
Q is the volume flow 
V is the velocity 
D is the diameter of the pipe 
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 This expression is for Newtonian fluids and not for complex fluids such as 
slurries. 
The pressure drop can be used to calculate how much the diameter has in-
creased due to wear, but also to calculate the thickness of fouling if this is the 
problem. In systems with no wear and with clean water, the pressure drop can 
be used to calculate the water flow. This method was used for the pipe auto-
clave where the last 50 m of pipes had a diameter of 10 mm. It turned out later 
that the wear was in fact a problem in that pipe, and it had resulted in a leak in a 
bending. 
8.1.6 Limits for the process and the plant 
Limits are references expressing lower and upper limits for certain process pa-
rameters. Every process and every plant is subject to certain limitations. These 
limitations are implemented and used for control in various ways, in particular 
by limit values applied in the automatic control system or by the operator. It 
could be limits on levels in tanks; pressures and temperatures in systems; pres-
sures and temperatures in the process; flow of the medium treated; reaction 
time; difference between pressures across filters etc. 
Such limits can be used in the display, to show how far the process is from 
reaching this or that limitation. For example, an alarm could be installed to ap-
pear when the control system of a pump has reached  95% of full speed, where 
normal operation with a recently maintained pump is 65%. These two numbers 
could be of importance for the operator who must be alert about a possible deg-
radation of the pump or of the connected clutch. 
8.1.7 Validity of the reference 
As the references are important for the observation of deviations in goals, 
functions and conditions of the plant, the question of relevant references must 
be part of a questionnaire to the designer of the display system. The quality of 
the information sources used as references must be analysed with respect to va-
lidity as it is done in the following table. 
 
Source of knowledge Classification Example 
Component characteristics Always valid Pump characteristic 
Design parameters Valid only under 
design conditions 
Terminal temperature difference 
(TTD) in heat exchangers 
Physical laws Always valid Gas equation. P=f(T )for saturated 
steam 
Fundamental natural laws Always valid Mass and energy conservation 
Specific properties of mat-
ters 
Always valid Thermal conductivity of materials 
Empirical rules and mod-
els 
Indicators 
                 ? Pressure drop across a well 
known pipe. 
Limits Some can be 
changed during 
operation and as 
a fault during 
maintenance. 
Upper limit for a pressure to pro-
tect the components. 
Table 10 Classification scheme for references 
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References, which are invariant regardless of the operating conditions, are 
more valid than those, which are valid only under design conditions, such as 
TTD, the terminal temperature difference in a heat exchanger. This quantity, 
TTD, could be measured at different operating conditions and thereby act as a 
characteristic for the heat exchanger, but it is normally not used that way. De-
sign parameters are useful under design condition, to look for degradation in the 
components. References, which are valid just under certain operation condi-
tions, can sometimes be used as other information in other operating condition. 
E.g. The calculated pressure drop across a pipe with a flow of clean water will 
always be lower than the pressure drop across the same pipe if the medium is 
slurry at the same flow, but the value for clean water gives at least an informa-
tion about the lowest pressure drop across the pipe.  
Now we postulate that the designer knows everything possible to obtain about 
the process, the plant, the behaviour of the plant, the risks connected to the plant 
and how they occur but: 
The knowledge of the plant is not a specification of what to present, because 
the knowledge have to be structured due to a strategy. The next chapter de-
scribes a strategy for determining the content of the display. 
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Part III 
Risø-PhD-8(EN)   93
   Risø-PhD-8(EN) 94
 9. Content of Information. The Goal-
Tree Fault-Tree (GTFT) method. 
The design of the pipe autoclave display system, using the configural display 
method and other well known presentations forms, the positive experience of 
using the displays during operation and the experience with the overview dis-
plays, using the same types of presentations, for (1) the nuclear reactor, (2) the 
waste incineration plant and (3) the condenser, gave inspiration to develop a 
guide for the design of displays for process plants.  
The term ‘guide’ is to be taken in a practical sense, that is, the guide should be 
a tool that provides the designer with advice about how to extract the necessary 
information, and how to present it. 
Experience from the operation of the pipe reactor showed, among others, that 
it would have been valuable to know the results from a risk analysis of the plant 
before the initial start up. If a risk analysis had been performed on the pipe 
autoclave system, the operators would have been more aware of the problems 
that might occur during operation; and they would also have been better pre-
pared for deviations in operation and for how to detect them in time.  
In the development of the guide, methods from risk analysis of process plants 
are taken into account, and the same questions that were used for the waste in-
cineration plant and the condenser are posed: 
 
• What is the purpose? 
• What are the problems? 
• How do the problems occur? 
• How are the problems detected? 
• How should the problems be presented? 
 
These questions constitute the main ‘body’ of the strategy, and for small, 
well-known parts of a plant they will in many cases be sufficient. But to form a 
precise and exhaustive guide they must be enhanced. The aim of the strategy 
described in the sequel is to enable the operator to detect incipient failures on 
the displays before the goals are disturbed. 
9.1  The Goal-Tree Fault-Tree method (GTFT) 
 
The proposed guide/strategy is mainly based on a fault-tree analysis, which 
compared with the Abstraction Hierarchy (AH) framework described in Chapter 
2, is more problem-oriented. The fault-tree is in this context used as a qualita-
tive analysis tool. A strategy where a tree structure can be used to extract 
knowledge gives a good overview of how a break of constraints, or just a devia-
tion from the intended, propagates through the system. The fault tree is a struc-
tured description of how a failure or a coincidence of failures can propagate into 
a number of higher-level functions, which if broken, will lead to an unwanted 
top event. The detection of early failures that can result in disturbances of func-
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 tions and goals is also important knowledge when deciding how to present in-
formation on the displays.  
The fault-tree analysis is normally an analysis of a known unwanted event on 
a lower level than e.g. stop of production, but an event that can lead to a stop of 
the production or to an unsafe situation. The author found it was natural to com-
bine a Goal-Tree, to achieve the higher-level functions, with a Fault-Tree that 
describes the events influencing such higher-level functions as well as the goals. 
The Goal-tree in this context describes goal and sub-goals. The number of lay-
ers with sub-goals is not determined. The failed sub-goals are then taken as the 
top-events for the fault-tree analysis. The information obtained from this analy-
sis gives also the information required for using the AH structure, if this struc-
tured functional hierarchy is found appropriate when the design the display has 
to be assessed. The Fault-Tree part includes the control systems and the safety 
systems, just like it includes any other type of equipment. It is not quite obvious 
where to place control systems and passive safety systems in the AH. The root 
causes found using the fault tree will also give input to the requirements to con-
dition monitoring of systems and components. Condition monitoring is in the 
AH placed on the Physical Function level.  
Another problem to take care of is to distinguish between the purpose of the 
process and the purpose of the process equipment. We shall illustrate this by an 
example: extraction of Uranium in an alkaline process from ore, following a 
specific chemical reaction. 
To extract Uranium is the purpose of the chemical process. The purpose of the 
plant is to establish the conditions for this process to take place.  
The questionnaire used in the GTFT method is shown below in a short ver-
sion; it poses more or less the same questions that are used for the Goal-tree-
Success-tree, GTST, method [24] where a Goal-Tree is applied, but for the 
GTFT method both on the process level and on the equipment level. It is rec-
ommended to use the GTFT on the process itself to analyse unwanted reactions 
such as run-away reactions. 
As soon as the sub-goals for the system are identified, the analysis proceeds 
by means of a Fault-Tree analysis to identify the problems in achieving these 
sub-goals. 
 
OVERALL DESIGN PURPOSES: 
What are the purposes of the displays? 
 
GOAL TREE: 
The process 
What is the goal of the process (the medium)? 
What are the requirements for the process goal? 
Which problems are connected with the process? 
 
The plant or system 
What is the goal of the plant or system (equipment)? 
What are the sub-goals for the goal to be achieved? 
 
FAULT TREE: 
What are the problems associated with the sub-goals? 
How do the problems occur? 
 
PRESENTATION OF THE GOALS, FUNCTIONS AND PROBLEMS 
How are the goals and functions observed? 
How are the problems detected?  
How to present the goals, functions and problems to the operator? 
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In the following, the different aspects of the strategy are elaborated. 
What are the purposes of the displays? 
 
A display system for a process plant contains many displays, each of them 
with a specific purpose that must be assessed before the system can be designed. 
Examples of the different purposes of displays, or rather: of the information 
they present to the operator, is that it should make him able to:  
 
• Supervise various goals and functions in the plant, e.g., heating and 
cooling functions.  
• Monitor the condition of a specific component. 
• Supervise the control system. 
• Get an overview of the entire plant  
 
What is the goal of the process? 
 
There is often more than one goal in a process plant, e.g., the goal of the process 
and the goal of the plant. In the sector of chemical production, the same plant is 
sometimes used for making different products, each of them being produced 
according to a specific chemical reaction; and each reaction gives rise to spe-
cific problems that influence the sub-goals of the process system. To analyse the 
total production, it might be appropriate to distinguish between the process 
problems and the system problems. 
 
Which hazards or risks are connected with the process? 
 
Hazards and risks may arise as the result of, among other, the following 
events: exothermal processes; pollution of the product (e.g. during the produc-
tion of medicine); radioactive radiation (e.g. at nuclear power plants); toxic 
emissions (e.g. during the production of weed control chemicals); explosions. 
Such hazards are the top events for a fault tree analysis for analysing the root 
causes for such an event to happen. The hazards are identified by means of a 
hazard analysis of the process. A hazard analysis often forms part of the design 
criteria for the control system for a process plant, but also for the equipment 
chosen for the process plant. 
 
What are the requirements for achieving the process goal? 
 
For power production it is the processes of phase changes of water ending up 
with high pressure steam to be used for the turbine function of converting ther-
mal energy into mechanical energy. For chemical processes it can be a demand 
to temperature, pressure, additives etc. 
 
What is the goal of the system? 
 
The goal of the system is to establish the right conditions for the process to 
happen in a safe and economical way. 
Concerning condition monitoring, it can be a requirement for a component for 
optimal function, the latter signifying that the component works at the intended 
part of its characteristic, or rather: the deviation from this characteristic is ac-
ceptable. 
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 What are the sub-goals for the goal to be achieved? 
The sub-goals are the requirements on a lower level to the system necessary 
for the top goal. 
 
 
What are the problems of the sub-goals?  
 
For a goal or sub-goal, the problems are (1) failures in the supporting func-
tions on several levels, or (2) a failed state, e.g. pressure not established. The 
failed functions and states for a specific goal can be elicited using the fault tree 
analyses. 
 
How do the problems occur? 
 
A problem may arise gradually from wear in components, but can also be 
caused by a sudden breakdown of components, e.g. a broken shaft of a valve or 
a pipe rupture. ‘Breakdown of components’ includes the breakdown of the con-
trol system such as instability due to parameter drift. The information on this 
level can be extracted from the fault tree analysis. 
 
How are the problems detected? 
 
The aim of this strategy for display design is to enable the operator to detect 
incipient failures before the goals are disturbed. An analysis must be made to 
reveal how functional failures are detected as early as possible. The detection of 
deviations requires that two questions must be addressed: What is the situation? 
and: How should it be? More specifically we may ask: 
 
Which references exist in the process and in the plant? 
 
The use of references is essential in the detection of deviations, and should be 
presented on the displays. 
Deviations from operating characteristics for components and systems must 
be examined; and so must any observation that seems to represent a deviation 
from physical principles and invariants that the process should follow or should 
have as a constraint. 
When answering this item in the strategy, it may be necessary to take some of 
the higher levels information into regard, such as the conservation laws for mass 
and energy.  
 
• The conservation laws for mass can be used to keep control of mass 
inventory and for the detection of leaks in pipes, e.g. pipe lines for oil 
and gas. The energy conservation law is used e.g. when calculating 
efficiencies on power plants. 
 
• For condition monitoring it is valuable to have access to characteris-
tics for the component. Even if the condition of a component has de-
creased, the component may still be able to achieve its purpose e.g. 
due to the feed back control. For condition monitoring, a deviation 
from the intended condition must be supervised, e.g. it should be de-
tected if the working point for a pump deviates from the pump charac-
teristic. 
 
• It may also be helpful to consider the physical characteristics of the 
process itself, e.g. the saturation curve used on the display for the 
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condenser. Similar characteristics exist for other media such as am-
monia and metals, e.g. phase-diagrams. 
 
 
 
How to present the problem for the operator? 
 
The presentation of information must be clear and has as one of the purposes 
to decrease the complexity of interpretation task in case of a disturbance in the 
plant. This is also the aim for the Ecological Interface Design. The question will 
be discussed in chapter 10 
9.1.1 Illustration of the method and a questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 58  Goal-Tree Fault-Tree 
 
Goal Tree- Fault Tree GTFT
Goal for the process Goal for the
process
Requirements Requirements to the 
process
Problems in the process
How to do it Plant
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                    And gates 
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Sub-goal 
1
Sub-goal 
2
Sub-goal 
3
Sub-goal 
4
                 And+or gates          Goal Tree
What are the 
problems
               And+Or gates
How do the 
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occure?
Root causes         Fault Tree
How are the problems observed?
How to present the problems?
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 The graphical method can be supplemented with a questionnaire, which may 
clarify the problems of how to observe goals and functions and how to detect 
deviations from intended operation. 
 
Questions Answers Data 
What is the purpose of the 
display? 
 
  
What is the goal of the 
system/process?  
 
  
What are the sub-goals? 
 
  
What are the problems?   
How do the problems oc-
cur? 
  
How are the problems 
detected? 
  
Which references can be 
used: 
  
Invariants and physical 
laws in the process? 
 
  
Design parameters?   
Characteristics? 
 
  
Controls:   
Control actions? 
 
  
 Presentation:   
How to present the goals, 
the functions and the 
problem? 
 
  
 
9.1.2 Discussion of the method 
At this point of the proposed method it is appropriate to discuss if there are limi-
tations to the use of the GTFT method? What can it be used for? How many 
layers are necessary? Who can use the method?  
The method is top-goal based which means that it starts with a goal and the 
analysis is based on requirements for maintaining this top goal. This means that 
a change in top goal will require another analysis e.g. efficiency, production and 
safety as different top goals will give different inputs to what the operator has to 
observe to fulfil the goal.  In case the top goal is efficiency of a power plant, the 
pressure in the condenser is one of the most important parameters to overview, 
but this parameter is not important if safe production is the top goal. This prob-
lem is also relevant to the Abstraction Hierarchy. 
The overall goal for both the AH and the GTFT method is to specify impor-
tant information to supervise for the operator to be able to prevent serious acci-
dents and therefore are the top goals related to safety and that is what both 
methods are developed to cope with. 
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A fault tree analysis is a well-known method for calculating the probability of 
the top event to happen. The lowest levels in the analysis are the ones where 
data are available such as failure frequency of pump. The failures could be due 
to wear or to maintenance failures. The fault tree method used in the GTFT 
method has its main purpose to give an overview on the important sub-goals, 
functions and root causes to be observed and how they are dependent of each 
other. The next phase concerning the content of the displays is to determine how 
to follow the status and changes of these goals, functions and incipient root 
causes online.  
Failures due to maintenance failures will not occur especially as a mainte-
nance failure but as the online measured consequence of a maintenance failure. 
 
9.1.3 Summary of the method 
The GTFT is a dynamic presentation of degradation and faults in a plant and 
the propagation of these events upwards in the system. 
There is no exact number of layers neither of sub-goals nor of layers in the 
fault tree. It depends on the plant. 
A display designer must have a good knowledge of the plant, its behaviour 
and the possible risks, which can occur in case the control system and the safety 
system fail. The designer or usually the design team will then be able to make a 
sufficient GTFT analysis for a qualitative analysis.   
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 9.2 Example: Uranium extraction in a pipe auto-
clave. 
The Goal-Tree-Fault-Tree method and the AH will now be illustrated using 
the example: extraction of uranium from ore in a pipe reactor. 
 
9.2.1 The Process 
For the chemical process itself the goal is to extract uranium from ore follow-
ing a specific chemical reaction equation. The requirements to the process are: 
sufficient oxygen must be present; the pH value must be above a certain level; 
similarly, the temperature must be above a certain level; and the reaction must 
be allowed to continue for sufficiently long time. 
 
 
Goal of the
process
Extraction of 
uranium in a wet 
alkaline process
U7=f(U5,Ph,temp,
time,O2)
Requirement
s to the 
process 
O2 supply Ph value Temperatur Reaction time
What is the
 problem ?
No problems
How does 
the problem
 occur?  
Figure 59 GTFT analysis of the process 
 
 
In case these conditions are not fulfilled, the efficiency of the process is not 
optimal or is zero, but not unsafe. 
The oxygen supply can be measured; the pH value in the prepared slurry is 
measured; the temperature in the reactor is measured; and finally, the length of 
the reactor, together with the maximum flow of the pump, determine the mini-
mum reaction time. 
If the reaction was exothermal and there were a risk of a runaway reaction, 
one of the requirements would be to avoid such a reaction. To keep a process on 
the safe side of a runaway reaction is to keep it within certain temperature con-
straints or/and to keep the ingredients of a mixture within certain limits. The 
information about what to avoid must appear clearly on the displays.
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 9.2.2 The Plant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Goal Tree-Fault Tree   GTFT
Goal of the
system 
Wet oxidation of a 
slurry in a pipe 
autoclave
at T=Tset
Sub-goals       
Requirements to 
the process plant
Wet 
conditions in 
the autoclave
Slurry transport
conditions
Mixing conditions Energy 
available
What are the
 problems ?
Air in the pipes Boiling in the
 pipes
Particles not lifted 
+
Reduced mixing
of additives
Reduced 
energy supply
How do the 
problems
 occur?
Suction side 
requirements 
not
fulfilled          1.
Reduced
 pressure
P<=Psat
Reduced 
velocity
V<Vcrit
Reduced
 turbulence
Re < Re-set
Reduced
heat 
transmission
Reduced
external energy 
supply
Lov level 
in tank
Pre-pressure
low
Reduced
 flow
Degraded heat
exchanger
Reduced steam 
flow
     x              x
Pump
failure
Leak internal 
leak
Fouling Steam trap
failed
open/closed
Steam supply
failure
Valve failure  Suction
      side
  req. not 
  fulfilled
      1.
Speed 
set to
low
wear of pipe
or broken pipe
Frozen Mechanical
failure
steam generator
failed
wear or
broken shaft
How are the 
problems
detected?
Characteristics
Physical laws
Design 
parameters
 Skema
Pipe autoclave
Steam
P1
T1
P2
T2
P3
T6T3 T4 T5
P4
T7
P5
T8
 
Figure 60 GTFT method applied to the pipe reactor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the presentation of information about the operation, goals, functions and 
condition of the plant, the method will attach importance to the use of refer-
ences. The references can be taken from the design of the plant, the physical 
laws the process has to follow, the invariants in the process, the component 
characteristics and, of course, the assessed upper and lower limits for some of 
the variable. 
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 The questionnaire filled in according to the GTFT: 
 
Questions Answers Observations and de-
tections 
What is the purpose of 
the display? 
 
Overview the purpose and func-
tions of the autoclave. 
 
What is the goal of the 
system? 
 
Wet oxidation of uranium in a 
pipe reactor at temperature  
T=275oC according to the equa-
tion: 
U7=f(U5,Ph,temp,time,O2) 
Show the temperatures 
T at the inlet of the 
reaction pipes and the 
set point temperature 
Tset=275oC 
What are the sub-goals? 
 
Wet conditions in the pipe reac-
tor 
Slurry transport conditions 
Mixing conditions 
Energy available 
 
What are the problems? Boiling in the pipes 
Air in the pipes  
Sliding particles  
Reduced mixing  
Reduced energy 
 
How do the problems 
occur? 
Pressure in the pipes too low 
due to: 
Pump failure 
 
Leak 
 
Pre-pressure too low due to pre-
pressure pump problems. 
Storage tank level L to low 
Velocity V of the slurry too low 
due to: 
Pump failure and leak 
 
 
Reduced turbulent flow due to: 
Flow too low 
Reduced energy supply due to: 
Steam system failure 
 
 
Steam trap failure 
 
Fouling 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leak 
 
 
 
 
P equal to the saturation 
pressure Psat 
Deviation from intended 
flow at that speed 
Mass balance: 
 Flowin = Flowout
 
Pre-pressure< Ppre-min
 
L lower than Lmin 
 
 
V lower than Vcrit 
Flow F lower than re-
quired flow for the slurry 
Re too low 
E less than required E 
Flow < Flow(Re-min) 
 
Steam flow too low 
Steam temperature too 
low 
Temperature increase 
across HE too low. 
Thermal conductivity 
of the material decreased 
=> Heat transmission 
coefficient too low => 
Temperature increase 
across HE too low. 
Pressure drop in-
creased 
Mass balance not ful-
filled. 
Change in Flow 
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How are the problems 
detected? 
By observation of the deviation 
between expected values and 
measured values, or values cal-
culated from measurements 
 
Which references can 
be used: 
  
Invariants and physical 
laws in the process? 
 
The saturation pressure Psat for 
steam at temperature T  
The pressure drop across a pipe 
Other thermal equations 
Mass- and energy balance 
Psat=f(T) 
 
 
dP=f(Q,D…..) 
 
E=UA(Ti-Ty) etc. 
 
Design parameters? Terminal Temperature Differ-
ence (TTD) for condensing Heat 
Exchangers = Constant for de-
sign conditions 
TTD for liquid-liquid heat ex-
changers = Constant 
 Temperature increase across 
each heat exchanger = Constant 
Tsteam-Tind = constant  
 
 
 
Tprimary-out – Tsecondary-in = 
constant 
Tn-1 – Tn = constant 
Characteristics? 
 
Pump characteristic Flow=constant*speed 
Controls:   
Control actions? 
 
Manual pump control 
Automatic control of steam  
 
Tsteam
and set point for the 
steam temperature 
Tsteam-set
 
 Presentation:   
How to present the goals, 
the functions and the 
problems? 
 
Presentation of goals, intended 
goals and deviations. 
Presentation of intended func-
tions and deviations. 
Presentation of described con-
sequences of the faults and fail-
ure by use of measured data, 
calculated information, refer-
ences and different types of 
drawings according to an analy-
sis of the deviation from nor-
mal. 
Drawings 
Trend curves 
Graphical presentation 
 
According to an analysis 
of the measured data and  
what the operator has to 
observe and how. 
 
Table 11 Information listed according to the GTFT method 
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9.3 Use of the Abstraction Hierarchy to compare 
the information determined by the GTFT method 
In this section we first use the Abstraction Hierarchy (AH) to specify informa-
tion for displays for the pipe reactor; thereafter we evaluate the information 
specified by the GTFT method. 
 
Pipe autoclave
Steam
P1
T1
P2
T2
P3
T6T3 T4 T5
P4
T7
P5
T8
 
Figure 61 Pipe reactor system 
 
The main purpose of the Abstraction Hierarchy is to represent information 
from all levels of the function of the plant in question according to the means-
end relations. The detailed information for each level is provided by a part-
whole analysis. 
 
 
Functional Purpose:  Production flow models, system objectives, constraints, 
etc. 
The functional purpose of the pipe autoclave is to increase the temperature of 
the slurry T4 to 275oC  and to keep the slurry at this temperature for 0.5 hours.  
 
Abstract Function: Causal structures: Mass-, energy- and information flow 
topology, etc. 
Mass flow and energy flow 
Constraints: 
• The velocity V of the slurry must be above the critical velocity Vcrit for 
the particles, to prevent the particles from sliding in the pipes, i.e., 
there must be lift on the particles. 
• Mass- and energy conservation laws. 
 
Generalised Function: “Standard” functions and processes:  Feed back 
loops, heat transfer, etc. 
The standard functions are 
Condensation, heat transfer, heating, cooling and transport. 
 
Physical Function: Electrical, mechanical, chemical processes of component 
and equipment. 
Pump function 
 
Physical Form: Physical appearance and anatomy; material and form; loca-
tions, etc. 
Pump, heat exchangers, reaction pipes, steam supply system etc. 
 
 
  Risø-PhD-8(EN) 106
 
The information to be presented from the different levels is listed in the table 
below.  
 
Levels Functions Information to show  
Functional Purpose 
 
Safe autoclaving of slurry at 
temperature T= Tset in a pipe 
autoclave in a safe way. 
T, Tset 
 
Abstract Function Energy flow 
Mass Flow 
 
 
 
 
Conservation of Energy and 
mass 
Supply of energy 
Flow of slurry 
Velocity higher than 
critical velocity,  
 V> Vcrit 
 
Flow in= Flow out 
Energy balance 
Generalised Func-
tion 
Condensation 
Heat transfer 
Heating 
Cooling 
 
 
Mass Transport 
dEsteam, dEslurry
T2-T1 
T3-T2 
T4-T3 
T6-T5 
T7-T8 
Flow 
Physical Function Pump Function 
 
 
Working point on the 
pump characteristic 
 
Physical Form Pump 
Heat exchangers 
Reaction pipes 
Steam supply system 
Pictograms 
Table 12   Information required using the AH 
 
When the table for the GTFT method is compared with the one for the AH, 
we can see that the information required from the AH framework is also deter-
mined by the GTFT method, but the reverse is not true: applying the Abstrac-
tion Hierarchy does not point to the necessity of a pressure above the point of 
saturation; at least it is difficult to find out where to introduce it. The GTFT also 
specify root causes, but the AH does not. 
It is not a surprise that the information revealed using the GTFT method ful-
fils the requirements from the AH framework. The difference between a means-
end hierarchy and  the GTFT method is that the former specifies layers that are 
either necessary requirements to the upper layer or goals for the layers below, 
while the latter (the fault tree) describes the sub-goals, the failed goals and the 
failed functions.  
Rasmussen and Vicente claim that also unexpected events are detected using 
the AH for the analysis since the AH looks for breaks of constraints on goals 
and functions. The GTFT method can just as well be claimed to detect unex-
pected events, since all the sub-goals necessary for the process and the plant to 
succeed are analysed in the GTFT method. 
 
 
 
Risø-PhD-8(EN)   107
 9.4  Information on the pipe reactor display  
The actual pipe reactor display presents some of the information that is re-
quired using the GTFT method. The following table lists the required informa-
tion and shows which parts are presented on the displays Figure 25, Figure 28, 
Figure 29, Figure 30 and Figure 31. 
 
Observations and detections   
   
Show the temperatures 
T at the inlet of the reaction pipes and the 
set point temperature Tset
YES  
   
   
P equal to the saturation pressure Psat 
Deviation from intended flow at that speed 
Mass balance: 
 Flowin = Flowout
 
Pre-pressure< Ppre-min
 
L lower than Lmin 
 
 
V lower than Vcrit 
Flow F lower than required flow for the 
slurry 
Re too low 
E less than required E 
Flow < Flow(Re-min) 
 
 
Steam flow too low 
Steam temperature too low 
Temperature increase across HE too low. 
Thermal conductivity of the material de-
creased => Heat transmission coefficient 
too low => Temperature increase across 
HE too low. 
Pressure drop increased 
Mass balance not fulfilled. 
Change in Flow 
YES 
YES 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
 
YES 
 
 
YES 
NO 
YES 
 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
 
YES 
NO 
YES 
 
 
 
Flowout  not meas-
ured 
 
 
not measured 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not measured 
   
   
Psat=f(T) 
 
 
dP=f(Q,D…..) 
 
E=UA(Ti-Ty) etc. 
 
YES 
 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
Tsteam-Tind - The constant  
 
 
NO 
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Tprimary-out – Tsecondary-in = constant 
 
 
Tn-1 – Tn = constant 
 
YES 
 
 
YES 
Flow=constant*speed YES  
   
Tsteam
and set point for the steam temperature 
Tsteam-set
 
 
 
NO 
The measured 
values not available 
for the display 
   
Drawings 
Trend curves 
Graphical presentation 
According to an analysis of the measured 
data and what the operator has to observe 
and how. 
 
YES 
 
 
Even if the pipe reactor displays were designed before any strategy was avail-
able it appears from the above table that the displays do show most of the in-
formation required from the strategy.  
Among the problems that have not been discussed are the following: which 
quantities can we measure – and which of them are in fact measured? For ex-
ample, in the case of the pipe reactor, the energy and the mass balance cannot 
be calculated, due to a lack of flow measurements. The flow substance changes 
during the process: first cold slurry, later a hot mixture of slurry and gas which 
is, at any rate, difficult to measure. A leak in the pipe reactor system does not 
show in the mass balance but by a loss of pressure; therefore the operator needs 
an analysis of how different events can be detected so he can act as soon as it is 
indicated that something is not as it should be. 
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 10. Presentation of the Information. 
A Practical Guide 
Once it has been decided which information must be made available for the op-
erator to supervise the plant, the next problem arises: how to present this infor-
mation in a clear and appropriate way so that deviations from normal operation 
can be observed and interpreted without ambiguity and in time. 
Various ways to present information have already been discussed in chapters 
2-6. We shall now address the question of generalisation: is it possible to for-
mulate some general rules or proposals on how to present the information for 
the operator? The rules must be based on existing knowledge about different 
plants and about the information that was found to be necessary in the specific 
cases. Another question we must address is this: how can different levels of ab-
straction be presented according to the Goal-Tree Fault-Tree analysis. 
This chapter describes the different graphical elements and their use and pre-
sents, on this basis, some examples on how to visualize the decomposition of 
the goals and functions. We start out with describing four basic presentation 
forms 
• Single sensors- Single indications 
• Grouped presentations 
• Integrated presentation 
• Complex presentations 
10.1 Single Sensors – Single Indications Presenta-
tion 
The most common ways to present information of a single numerical quantity 
are: 1) by digits, 2) by an instrument, 3) by a bar graph. Each of them can be 
visualized on a mimic diagram, anchored to the position where the measurement 
is made. Besides we may include  4) trend curves which are usually shown on 
separate displays.  
The principle is ‘single sensors - single indications’ presentation on a mimic 
diagram, like in the old control room with the mimic diagram painted on the 
wall. 
 
 
123
      D igit s           Ins t ru-             B ar                   T rend curve
                           ment     
Figure 62 Single sensors - single indication presentations 
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 A mimic diagram including the variable values is the most common way of 
presenting the information. A mimic diagram is often just a copy of a PI- dia-
gram. All values are original measured values and often no calculated values are 
present, but the calculated values could be presented the same way. The trend 
curves are of course a presentation of two variables, the measured or calculated 
plant variable and the time. 
10.2 Grouped Presentation. 
Even if a number of numerical quantities are presented individually by way of 
single sensors – single indications, they may as a supplement be shown 
grouped, e.g., in a polar diagram. We shall look at two such polar diagrams, or 
as they are phrased in the spreadsheet program Excel: ‘radar diagrams’:  a non-
normalized plot of 11 variables, and a normalized plot showing the same vari-
ables: 
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Figure 63 Non-normalized radar diagram  (Excell version) 
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Figure 64 Normalized radar diagram 
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The normalized plot uses the outer regular (symmetrical) polygon as a fixed 
reference for variables presented and it just requires a glance at the plot to ob-
serve deviations from the reference polygon. In the non-normalized plot this is 
less easy even if the figure is supplemented 
with a reference polygon. Even at a smaller 
size and with many variables included, the 
normalized polar diagram is quite often able 
of clearly indicating that something has 
changed. By contrast, the non-normalized po-
lar diagram may be useful for other purposes 
but it is of little use for a plant operator in his 
supervision task: the shape of the polygon pertaining to normal operation can be 
very complex to remember, and therefore it is difficult to observe when a devia-
tion has occurred. 
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 The normalised polar diagram may serve as a first indication that something is 
happening somewhere in the plant. However the variables must be arranged 
adequately in the display, for example in groups according to sub-systems of the 
plant. The polar plot can be combined with the mimic diagram. 
10.3  Integrated presentation 
Screen-based process control offers a number of possibilities, such as:  to use 
curves, to use a combination of several displays, each with its own purpose; to 
have figures moving on the screen. The last option, moving figures, should be 
used for showing the dynamics of a process, as is the case for the pipe autoclave 
displays.  
In computer based systems one may also choose to change reference curves 
automatically, as in the case of condition monitoring of a centrifugal pump 
where the characteristic depends on the speed of the pump. Again, we empha-
size that the use of references is always valuable for observing a deviation in the 
operation of a plant.  
Below find some examples of how such an integrated presentation can be 
utilised. We have to distinguish between the process going on in the plant and 
the system itself. 
 
The process 
For an optimal production, the process itself, e.g., energy conversion or a 
chemical process going on in the plant is presupposed to take place in a certain 
well-defined manner. Everywhere in the plant the process is assumed to be in a 
well-defined state or in a transition to a well-defined state. In water-based 
power plants the state of the water can be: fluid water, steam, superheated steam 
etc. The state of the water can be assessed from measuring the pressure and the 
temperature. In a state diagram, as the Mollier diagram, the actual states, differ-
ent places in the plant can be plotted in the shape of actual working points (WP), 
as did Beltracci to get the Rankine cycle display[4] 
For a thermal state in a plant, the working point can either lie on a reference 
curve, below the curve, or above it. For example, the reference curve for satu-
rated steam is the so-called saturation curve, and if the WP for a condenser de-
viates from the saturation curve there is a deviation from the expected situation. 
It can also happen that the working point lies on the curve but at a wrong place, 
which indicates another type of non-expected situation. Examples of deviations 
and their interpretations are provided by the displays for the pressuriser and for 
the condenser Figure 10 and Figure 46. 
Risø-PhD-8(EN)   113
 A visualisation of the deviation between the WP and the set point, can be used 
to quickly indicate that the temperature or the pressure does not have the desired 
value, which means that something is not as it should be and we have to find the 
reason why. The temperature increase, due to exothermal reactions, should in 
principle follow a specific curve, either due to time or to chemicals added. De-
viation from this curve, especially if the temperature increase is too fast, means 
that action must be taken to prevent an uncontrolled exothermal reaction, which 
could otherwise result in an explosion. 
 
The system 
The goal of the plant is to establish the right conditions for the process in the 
plant. The conditions can differ from process to process and references and set 
points are different for each process. Many chemical plants are used for differ-
ent processes, which can change every day. Furthermore the plant component 
and systems itself has also some references and set points, which are fixed and 
determined during the design process. These references are connected to the 
protection of the components and thereby also the safety of the plant and the 
process. The references can be: 
• Pressure and temperature allowed for the components. 
• Levels in tanks.  
• The working points for pumps. 
 
10.3.1 Examples on presentations 
 
 
Expected W P
W P
Reference curve
+ W orking P oint
+Expected W P
Mimic diagram
+Configural curve
+Reference
Position
Value
Figure 65 Types of integrated information 
 
 
The examples shown on Figure 65 apply to many different situations. The 
presence of a reference curve together with the actual WP and the expected WP 
is useful, both for e.g. the thermal states of a plant and for condition monitoring 
for components. The display can also include the acceptable limits for deviation 
from the references. 
Configural curves are curves connecting WP’s in an xy-diagram, where the x 
is the position of a variable anchored to a mimic diagram, and the y is the value 
a variables to be shown. 
Configural curves are valuable for showing dependent variables such as the  
temperatures across a plant, or the pressure and the energy distribution across 
part of a plant. Such curves can make it easier to supervise district-heating sys-
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tems, both for the energy loss and the energy consumption, and even to observe 
leakages. For long distance pipe-lines, configural displays for supervision of the 
pressure would be informative, to control both the pressure drops and the pres-
sure increase in each pump station. 
Figure 66 shows a presentation of the energy flow for a power plant. The 
presentation can be combined with an overview display for the plant and with 
some references for normal energy flow. For each flow, a calculation in % of 
the original energy would also be informative since it would indicate the effi-
ciency in each step of energy conversion. 
 
Water                         Steam                   Mechanical            ElectricalFuel
 
 
Figure 66  Energy flow in a power plant 
 
This type of information could also be used for other types of flow, e.g. a flow 
of mass or a flow of production units. 
 For condition monitoring of components, it is obvious to use integrated graph-
ical presentation, as exemplified by the pump, the condenser and the autoclave 
pipe. 
One detail of the DURESS display, shown in Figure 67 could be used as an 
integrated display too. It shows very clearly whether the content in the tank, 
with an input and output, (mass or energy) is increasing or decreasing.  
 
  
Flow in
Flow out
Decreasing level                      Increasing level  
 
Figure 67 Tank  information 
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 10.4 Complex integrated Information 
The most complex integrated displays are often specific to the purposes to 
which they have been developed: they may be packed with good ideas, but at 
the same time these ideas are sometimes so specific that they cannot be recom-
mended for general purposes. A typical example is the DURESS display devel-
oped by K. Vicente, described in Chapter 2. It is indeed a complex integrated 
display including various devices which may be quite useful in special situa-
tions but are difficult to include in a general guideline.  
In a project concerning information from an unmanned submarine, the author 
designed, a.o., the displays in  Figure 68. A combination of different values is 
compressed into a part of a submarine conning display. The example shows 
how several different variables can be presented together in an easy a simple 
way (Paulsen [30])  
 
 
 
 
 
 Inclination                  
 = 5 deg. 
 
 
 
Rudder = 7 deg. 
 
Surface 
 
Θ=15 deg.                     H=30m 
 
 
 
 Vel=5 Kn.                    Alt= 2m 
Figure 68  Displays for an UAV  
 
 
The length of the arrow represents the velocity of the submarine, the direction 
of the arrow its direction of movement. The depths H under sea level as well as 
the altitude A above the sea floor are shown too, and so is the shape of the sea 
floor hitherto passed. Θ denotes the angle of inclination, that is, the vertical di-
rection of movement. Even the inclination and the rudder position of the craft 
are visualised in the display. As a supplement, colours could be used to indicate 
if the position above the sea floor is within a required limit, and similarly for the 
inclination. 
 What we have described is merely a part of the information in the sub-
marine conning display, not all of it – just to exemplify how information can be 
combined graphically. 
10.4.1 Presentation of control system 
If a control system had been used for the pipe reactor in chapter 3 it would have 
looked like the one on the figure 67. A set point for the temperature at the inlet 
to the reaction pipes controls a steam valve and thereby the amount of steam. A 
set point for the flow controls the speed of the pump. A safety critical set point 
for minimum flow will change the process flow from slurry to water to prevent 
the slurry from damaging the pipes or blocking the pipes. 
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A proposal for presentation of the control system, also known from PI dia-
grams, is presented in the figure. 
A + or a – sign indicates if the controller is in action, or the controlled com-
ponent change speed, position or power. What are measured depends on what 
can be measured. The dotted lines show the input to the controller. Trend curves 
of the information must be present too, e.g. the controller position or, for a 
pump, the percentage of maximum speed. 
 
 Figure 69 Pipe reactor with control system 
10.5   Display design 
The results obtained from the GTFT analysis are requirements for supervision 
of component behaviour, system functions, sub-goals and plant goals. How can 
the graphical elements described in the previous chapter be used for this super-
vision?  
Supervision of components must take into regard both the condition of the 
components and their functions. Condition monitoring is a measure of degraded 
behaviour, i.e.,of the deviation from intended behaviour, which corresponds to 
the design parameters or characteristics in the actual situation. In this case it is 
convenient to have an integrated display based on the component characteristic 
or design parameters, and on this plot the expected WP and the actual WP as 
shown in [Figure 46]a . Set points and limits can be shown on this type of dis-
plays too as seen on [Figure 31]. On this display the deviation from expected 
condition can be seen, as well as distance to the limits. The information is also 
valuable for the maintenance planning. 
To supervise the functions of the components it would be appropriate to have 
a mimic diagram showing where the components are placed, while the function 
of a component is dependent of where in the system the component is installed. 
Anchored to this mimic diagram, configural curves show what happens in the 
component, e.g. heating, cooling, flow, pressure increases and decreases. These 
curves give the operator a visual indication of what is going on in the plant. 
References, goals and limits can be shown on the display, too. This type of dis-
play was used for the pipe reactor Figure 25 and for Lindsays’ display Figure 8. 
The control system can be shown on the mimic diagram cf.  .  
Goals, principles and sub-goals can be more specific and therefore they are 
harder to present in a general format. Still, the goal of a plant can often be 
shown digitally. 
It is also recommended to have trend curves on the measured and calculated 
values. 
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A Graphical Guide is the following: 
 
 
Subject Graphical method recommended 
Goal Digits - trend curves 
Principles  
Sub goals  
Plant function  
Component functions Configural curves 
Components condition Characteristics + WP’s 
Plant layout Mimic diagram + digits 
 incl. Controls +safety systems 
Table 13 GUIDE for presentation of graphical information 
 
Basically the guide follows the principle of the Abstraction Hierarchy, only 
other names are used for the content, and recommendations are given on how to 
present the information on different levels of functions and goals.  No fixed 
number of layers is laid down.  
 
Below, three examples are presented: a simple heat exchanger, the pipe reac-
tor and the pressurised water reactor. 
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10.5.1 A heat exchanger 
 
A heat exchanger is shown in this figure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T3, F
T4dT 
T1, F T2
Figure 70 Heat exchanger 
 
The purpose of the heat exchanger in a system is to heat a certain amount of 
fluid to a temperature Tset.  
The principle used is Newton’s 2nd law on energy conservation.  
The design of the heat exchanger has specified a Terminal Temperature Dif-
ference, dT. This quantity is known, the expected heat transmission coefficient 
k  is known and the design efficiency is known, all of them in ‘clean condition’. 
Besides it is assumed for this example, that there is the same flow of the same 
medium on both sides. 
The problems of such a heat exchanger are fouling, internal leaks and external 
leaks.  
In the following guide are listed how presentation of the condition, functions 
and goals are recommended. 
 
 
GUIDE 
Functional 
levels 
Visualized functions Constraints Graphical elements 
to use 
Goal Reach temperature  T2 Tset Digit or trend curve 
Principle Energy conservation 
Mass conservation 
Energy balance 
Flow balance 
Bar graphs 
Function Heating, 
 Cooling,  
Flows 
T3>Tset +TTD Configural element 
Condition K-value (Heat transmission 
coefficient) 
TTD (terminal temperature 
difference 
Efficiency 
Design parame-
ters 
Trend curves 
Plant lay-
out 
Mimic diagram  Symbols  
digits 
 
Next, Figure 71  shows how the heat exchanger and its functions may be pre-
sented, according to the graphical guide, on different levels of information. 
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T1, F1 T2,F2
T4,F4
T3, F3
Efficiency 
K value
               
time
+  characteristics + limits
Trend curves
dT
T1
T2  and Tset
T3
T4
dT
E1          E2
Goal, function and condition of a heat exchanger 
TsetTGOAL
PRINCIPLE
Energy conservation
FUNCTIONS
Heating, cooling
CONDITION
Design parameters
LAYOUT
Mimic diagram
Position
Temperature
Flow
Flow( not shown)
Mass Conservation F3-F4    F1-F2
T2=xxx
Figure 71 Presentation according to the Graphical Guide 
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 10.5.2 The pipe reactor 
Looking at the displays for the pipe reactor one can observe that the informa-
tion presented on the different displays is in accordance with the Graphical 
Guide. 
The following table specifies, for the different tasks of the pipe reactor, the 
displays on which the information is presented and the graphical elements used. 
 
  
Display 
number 
Functional 
levels 
Visualized 
functions 
Constraints Graphical 
elements 
used 
1, 3 Goal Temperature  
T1 
Tset Digit+trend 
curve 
5 Principle (Flow) Mixing by turbulent 
flow. 
Integrated 
display 
1 Functions Heating, 
Cooling, 
pressure 
drops 
Steam saturation 
curve as lower limit 
for the pressure 
Configural 
element 
2, 4, 5  Conditions 
For pipes 
and heat 
exchangers 
and the 
pump 
Pressure 
drops. 
 
 
Pump char-
acteris-
tic+WP 
Expected and Max. 
pressure drops 
 
 
Max pump pressure 
Min. flow 
Max. pump speed 
Bar graphs+ 
Integrated 
display with 
characteristic 
1, 2 Layout Mimic dia-
gram 
 Symbols  
digits 
 
 
A principle of a pipe reactor is to give the chemical reaction a specific reac-
tion time. A principle is also to mix chemical substances using a turbulent flow 
Energy- and mass conservation are important constraints for the pipe reactor. 
However these constraints are not visualized. For example, it would have been 
useful to be able to observe on the display if a leak of steam to the environment 
had occurred, but due to the lack of information of steam flow this was not pos-
sible. Similarly, in the case of a leak of slurry it would have been an advantage 
to be able to show it on the display. The use of the conservation laws require 
some more instrumentation than is normally seen on process plants. Power 
plants do not have measurements of flow on the turbine side, nor on the drains 
from the turbines used for preheating. This means that with existing instrumen-
tation is it not possible to follow the energy flow through the turbine system. 
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 Display for the pipe reactor according to the Graphical Guide 
 
T = 256 oC
Tset = 260
 oC 
GOAL 
FUNCTIONS 
LAYOUT 
RPM
Vcr
V p-sat
Max
Slurry punp
Flow
Speed
CONDITIONS
Figure 72 Presentation forms for a pipe reactor 
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10.5.3 The pressurized water reactor 
Looking at the overview display for the PWR and comparing the content with 
the requirements from the Graphical Guide, we can see that the layout and the 
general functions such as cooling, heating, heat transfer, pressure increase and 
pressure drops are present on the display.  
 
 Figure 66 in this chapter is an example of how to present energy transport and 
it satisfies the level of principle. The example on condition monitoring of the 
condenser is placed on the level of condition. On this level all other displays for 
component conditions must be placed too- among them the pressuriser display 
of Wiesang [in 48]. The functional purpose, i.e. the amount of power the plant  
produce can be visualized digitally, together with the set point. 
 
 
 
 
Display Functional 
levels 
Visualised func-
tions 
Constraints Graphical ele-
ments used 
 Goal Power  Set point Digits 
Example Principle Energy flow Energy conser-
vation 
Bar graphs  
Overview Functions Heating, cooling 
Mass flow 
Pressure increase 
Pressure decrease 
DT between 
primary and 
secondary side. 
 
Configural 
displays 
Condenser 
 
Pressuriser 
Condition Condenser pres-
sure 
Reactor pressure 
Steam saturation 
 
Pressure margin 
in the reactor 
Integrated dis-
plays 
Overview Layout Mimic diagram  Symbols and 
digits 
Table 14 Graphical elements used for a PWR  
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 999 MW 
Ref.  1000 Mw 
GOAL 
Water                         Steam                   Mechanical            ElectricalFuel
 
PRINCIPLE 
 
FUNCTIONS
LAYOUT 
P-sat   -     WP reactor    -     Pressure margin
0,00E+00
2,00E+01
4,00E+01
6,00E+01
8,00E+01
1,00E+02
1,20E+02
1,40E+02
1,60E+02
1,80E+02
200 220 240 260 280 300 320 340 360 380
Temperature
Pr
es
su
re
   
   
 b
ar
P-sat 
WP-reactor
wp-Pressuriser
WP- Pressuriser
Pressure margin
Temperature reactor 0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
P- saturation
curve
Pressure
Temperature
Expected Working Point
Fouling
Non Condensable 
gasses in condenser
 
CONDITIONS 
 
Figure 73 Some presentation  for a PWR 
 
This overall graphical information must be supplemented with trend curves and 
more detailed information for each subsystem. 
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 11. Discussion of the methods  
The author of this thesis claims to have developed a number of novel methods 
and features that can improve the design of display systems for the supervision 
of a process plant. In order to support the claim we must both outline the design 
methods that existed previously and assess what the new methods have contrib-
uted. 
As discussed in Chap. 1, Introduction and Chap. 2, State of the Art, there are 
virtually no written-down practical methods for the design of display systems 
for process plants – at least, no such methods exist that pay regard to the form-
versus content discussion. For many years, there has been a request for methods 
and principles aiming specifically at ‘how to place the dots and the lines’. The 
research in the field has mainly consisted of theoretical considerations; one ex-
ample is the development of Ecological Interface Design [51], EID. There are 
some applications of EID, but it seems difficult to generalize these applications 
into a method  of what the designer wants show in his display and how to pre-
sent the information. The Graphical Guide is a guide for designing EID using 
more well known methods. 
Rasmussen’s Abstraction Hierarchy, AH, has been conceived by many as a 
method to lay down the content of a display system. However it is rather a 
framework based on the engineering-oriented way of designing a process plant, 
asking questions such as:  
 
· What is to be produced? 
· What are the principles for the production? 
· Which processes are needed? 
· Which properties must the systems possess? 
· How are the systems combined into a plant? 
 
The Abstraction Hierarchy puts focus on the demand on the display system 
for containing information from all layers in the structure. When this demand is 
fulfilled, it is claimed that it is possible to locate a failure and plan how to re-
establish the state. 
The AH has not been described particularly well in the literature as a practical 
tool and has not, up to now, been used convincingly as a guide. To be able to 
provide information in each of the AH layers, one must, in our opinion, carry 
out a thorough risk analysis in order to expose the necessary functions, control 
measures, redundant systems and safety systems. The designer must know what 
are the hazards in the plant. For example, if energy conservation is used as a 
surveillance parameter for leakages, and the designer does not know that certain 
exothermic reactions in the process can develop into run-away reactions, then a 
serious problem may arise. The GTFT method takes care of this problem. 
Presently applied design tools recommend that a mimic diagram of the plant is 
drawn, and that variables are shown either digitally or by a bar graph. The 
mimic diagram may be supported by trend curves. Admittedly, these tools have 
fine facilities for following the control sequence diagrams. But there is no su-
perstructure to combine them, and no guide to doing it. This is what the author’s 
methods, the Goal-Tree Fault-Tree method (GTFT) and the Graphical Guide, 
contribute. The GTFT method specifies which information must be present in 
the display systems, and how it is structured in 1) goals, 2) functions and 3) 
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 conditions. The structure is closely related to that of the AH, and this is no sur-
prise since every process plant contains components with certain properties and 
functions, sub-systems with functions and goals to serve, the plant goal itself 
and a method on how to achieve this goal. These properties are inherent in 
process plants and cannot be changed.  Subsequently, the Graphical Guide of-
fers a guide to designing an appropriate structured graphical presentation, both 
concerning conditions, functions, goals and constraints.  
The official guidelines, too, contain some recommendations on the content 
and presentation elements in display systems, but there is no guidance as to how 
to provide the information or how to specifically apply the graphical elements. 
This is precisely what the two above-mentioned methods offer. Indeed, it is our 
long-term hope that the methods may be incorporated in the official guidelines 
when they have proved to be good, simple and robust. – The graphical elements 
used in the Graphical Guide are illustrated in NUREG-0700 rev.2 too, but not 
for specific purposes. 
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 12. Conclusion 
This thesis treats various topics connected with the design of display sys-tems 
for process plant operation. The work falls into three parts: 
 
Part I, Chap. 1-2 Introduction; State of the art  
Part II, Chap 3-8 The author’s own designs; Systems analysis methods 
Part III, Chap 9-12 Design guides; Discussion of methods; Conclusion 
 
Part I 
The Introduction (Chap. 1) briefly states the reasons why it is important to 
have a high quality display system in a control room, both with respect to the 
content of the single displays and to the way the information is shown. Investi-
gations at recently established power plants have shown that these still mainly 
rely on mimic diagrams, with measured variables indicated digitally. The mimic 
diagrams are supplemented with trend curves showing the time variation of se-
lected variable. Data from an inquiry form investigation of design strategies 
showed that no such strategies had been applied, and the designers had no 
knowledge of the recent research in the area. 
Why is the research being ignored? And what can be done to enhance the 
utilisation of novel technique? To answer these questions, a literature study was 
carried out on practice today as well as on actual research in control room in-
formation systems. 
The State of the Art account (Chap. 2) has two main points of view. Firstly, it 
outlines what the existing guidelines say about the content and form of display 
systems, and what they claim the systems must do. The guidelines specify a list 
of demands on the information systems in order for the operator to be able to 
carry out his tasks, and they point out that one must use the experience from the 
actual and similar plants. But there is no indication as to how the demands could 
be met. In short: the guidelines do not provide methods, they merely state a 
number of demands. 
Secondly, the chapter discusses the research in the area in the period 1980-
2000 and argues that here, too, indications of methods are sparse. The only 
well-known method, Rasmussen’s Abstraction Hierarchy, AH [ref.], is mainly a 
general framework describing a means-end hierarchy of functions and goals and 
stating that the operator must have information at each hierarchic level: from 
top level elements as well as from their constraints. 
The AH framework seems quite evident and convincing but has turned out to 
be difficult to apply in practice. Also, users have pointed out certain drawbacks 
of the AH, and there is a lack of a practical guide to its use as well as of illustra-
tive examples hereof. Thus, the reason why strategies and methods have hardly 
been applied could be that the designers did not have access to such strategies 
and methods, at least not in an applicable form. 
Finally, the chapter provides a number of examples of graphic display form 
that might form part of a structured guide to information presentation – which is 
among the very purposes of the thesis. 
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 Part II 
The core matter of this part is a thorough description of four display systems 
developed by the author. The first one is a full display system for a pipe re-actor 
(Chap. 3) used for wet-oxydation processes at high temperatures. The experi-
ence with the use of the system were convincing and led to an invitation from 
the OECD Halden Reactor Project to develop an overview display for a pressur-
ised water reactor (Chap. 4), which was tested on a full-scale simulator and 
proved to supply useful information to the user, both during normal operation 
and in abnormal situations. 
An overview display developed for a waste incineration plant in Germany 
(Chap. 5) illustrates that a rather simple design strategy, aiming at the needs, 
may lead to a better result than what would have come out if no strategy had 
been applied.  
The last display was developed for a condenser (Chap. 6) and concerns condi-
tion monitoring, a valuable tool to observe incipient failures or wear in a com-
ponent and, for such a reason, to take it out of operation be-fore its function is 
influenced. Control systems are connected to components and are usually able 
to compensate for the degradation of a component. The condenser display was 
tested on a simulator and by replaying data from a nuclear plant; the test showed 
that it was possible to distinguish between different types of degradation – and 
that the condenser functioned OK. 
The experience with the design and use of the waste incineration display en-
hanced the development of the strategy (Chap. 9) that resulted from the work in 
the PhD project. Other important factors in the development process were: risk 
analysis, thermodynamics and component theory. 
Chap. 7-8 outline the relevant systems analysis methods and point out the ref-
erences that may be used in a process plant. 
 
Part III 
An account is given of general methods that the author has developed, taking 
into regard what the guidelines prescribe; what other researchers have done; and 
what the author has done herself. 
As mentioned above, the AH has some inconveniences and drawbacks, but 
the means-end point-of-view may be supported in an obvious way by combin-
ing a goal-tree with a fault-tree (Chap. 9). 
The goal-tree describes the primary goal of the plant and the method used to 
achieve it. Sub-goals point out the processes needed to reach the goal, and simi-
larly for sub-sub-goals. Next, certain functions are needed, but at this step it is 
natural to pass on to a fault tree, describing how and why a failure may occur in 
these functions. By using a fault-tree one may include failures in both control 
functions, safety systems and component states. The outcome is a qualitative 
mapping of failures and their consequences in the plant, useful  in the analysis 
of what must be supervised. 
A comparative test of the goal-tree fault-tree method (GTFT)  against AH 
showed that GTFT provides not only the information claimed by the AH, but 
also information on necessary conditions, The GTFT method will also take con-
trols and safety systems into account. In addition, GTFT provides a useful gen-
eral view of the situation. 
 While Chap. 9 is concerned with the content of the displays, Chap. 10 
treats the presentation form. A key notion is the author’s ‘Graphical Guide’, 
summarised in Table 13. Based on normal graphical elements, the Graphical 
Guide gives a compact account of how one may show, in an illustrative way, 
important features such as 
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· Goals 
· Functions 
· Conditions 
· Plant layout 
 
The Graphical Guide was built up using 1) the NUREG guidelines and re-
ports, 2) the displays described in Chap. 2 (State of the art), and 3) the author’s 
own displays. The use of the guide is illustrated by examples, in particular for 
the pipe reactor display treated in Chap. 3. 
Chap. 11 contains a discussion of methods, with emphasis on the author’s 
own contributions: the Goal-Tree Fault-Tree method for determining the con-
tent and the Graphical Guide for presenting the information. 
What are the limitations of the two new methods? If the GTFT method is ap-
plied for a specific plant, the results will point at the information the operator 
must have to be able to diagnose a failure and to observe an incipient failure. 
The method aims at normal operation and not at, say, start or closing down 
situations. – The Graphical Guide does not specify how to present alarms nor 
how to take control actions from the screen. 
Still, it is the hope of the author that the two methods may contribute to the 
design of better display systems; that they may inspire new research in the field; 
and that they may perhaps even influence recommendations in future official 
guidelines. 
The present Chap. 12 draws the conclusion of the thesis and Chap. 13 lists the 
references to literature. 
 
 
 
An Appendix about graphical presentation of information from maintenance 
reports is included; to show that other strategies are applied for these purposes 
when users decide which information they want for their special needs. Another 
difference is the lack of a time pressure that is the problem in real time systems. 
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Appendix A 
Graphical Illustration of Information 
from Maintenance Reports 
 
The present paper describes the development and test of a computer tool aiming 
at safety and maintenance. The tool is based on the Nordic common failure re-
porting system containing data from 14 nuclear power blocks. The reports were 
collected over the years 1975-1995. 
As an example on how to use such a tool, a study of the high pressure charging 
pump on a PWR was done, and the result are reported below. The project forms 
part of the Nordic Nuclear Safety research program NKS and is carried out in col-
laboration with Sydkraft, Barsebäck, Swedish Nuclear Inspectorate (SKI), The 
Data Base Office (TUD-Kansliet) and Delft Technical University.  
Background and Scope of the Research 
As process plants grow older, the equipment reaches an age where the failure 
data may be observed to deviate from those predicted by the manufacturer. Age-
ing problems start to show up in the equipment, and it is time to reconsider the 
maintenance performance with the purpose of re-optimizing safety and productiv-
ity. 
 Nuclear equipment, e.g. safety systems, are complex high-technology 
systems that must operate for long periods of time without serious failures, and 
must be very durable. A great amount of redundancy and diversity is aimed at in 
nuclear facilities, to ensure the safety of the plant. Repairs, inspections and over-
haul of equipment are usually done at specific time intervals, when the plant is 
down for refuelling. This process generally follows a pattern of increasing com-
plexity, depending on the operating times accumulated by the system. 
 The physical environment in which the equipment operates is most 
straining and can have serious detrimental effect on the complex mechanical and 
electronic components of the equipment. High temperatures, strong vibrations, a 
high humidity and the presence of radiation all take their toll. This is why the reli-
ability characteristics, throughout the operating phase, may deviate from those 
specified by the supplier.  
 The nuclear power plants in the Nordic countries have established a 
common data-base to which all repairs of components are reported. Of the nuclear 
power blocks in Sweden and Finland, 14 have joined this data-base. Another data-
base containing reports from safety related failures, the so-called Licensee Event 
Reports, has also been established. The purpose of these data-bases is safety re-
lated and they are mainly used in the calculation of the reliability of components 
involved in safety studies.  
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  The aim of the work reported in this chapter is to use the data bases for 
ageing and maintenance assessment of the components, since good maintenance 
is necessary for a high safety and also for good economy. The development of 
statistical methods to support the different users with information for use in their 
daily work is part of the work.   
 
The personnel at the power plants have access to the data bases from terminals. 
Thereby they may use the data for their own purposes. 
 The investigation of well-known methods and the above-mentioned de-
velopment of new statistical methods form the main part of the work.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The users of the final tool are
primarily meant to be 
- Maintenance planners 
- Safety departments 
- Authorities 
- Craftsmen 
- Managers 
- Utilities 
- Operators 
and
The users need for information 
can be divided into the following 
main topics. 
- Maintenance 
- Ageing and condition 
- Safety 
- Economy 
To extract the right information, we must address such questions as: 
 - What is good maintenance? 
 - How do we measure maintenance quality? 
 - Which data are available for the purpose? 
 - How to present the results for the users? 
In nuclear power plants, safety has an important role in all questions, so one an-
swers to what good maintenance is could be 
- Minimize maintenance costs but keep safety high. 
In order to fulfil this goal, that is: minimize costs without reducing the de-
mands to safety, it is necessary to combine high quality components, high qual-
ity repair work, and punctual preventive repairs. In order to check if this combi-
nation has been achieved, let us list some possible indicators to measure or to 
calculate: 
-The amount of early failures after repair is low. 
-The amount of unplanned repairs is low. 
-The relation between preventive and corrective repairs is reasonable. 
-The failure rate is not increasing. 
-The time used for maintenance is not increasing. 
-The unavailability due to repair is low. 
-The repair rate is not larger than for identical components from other manufac-
turers. 
-The repair rate is not larger than for identical components elsewhere at the 
plant, or at other plants. 
 One thing is what the users want to measure, another is whether this in-
formation can be extracted from the available data. 
 A failure report contains information about the failure and the repair, but 
it also provides a classification of the failure type by describing how the failure 
was detected, by indicating the failure type and mode, and by giving a brief ac-
count of what has been done during repair. 
 To treat the information in the reports, including statistical analysis, a 
computer program was developed. An important objective in the design of the 
program was that it must be possible to pool data in several ways: from selected 
plants; from selected components; for a specified failure mode; or for a specified 
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time interval. Thus the user at one plant may, e.g., pool data from a selected group 
of other plants and compare the results with data from his own plant. 
 To elicit a given problem, a large number of graphs can be retrieved. The 
graphs can be organised as a hierarchical system where the user starts with over-
view graphs and then dives deeper and deeper into his problem. 
 A Pilot Study of Charging Pumps 
In this pilot study we have focused on three charging pumps at the Swedish nu-
clear power plant Ringhals 2 (# 334CSAPCH-01,-02,-03) to show which kind of 
information can be extracted from the TUD reports. 
 We did not read the reports in detail but rely on their time indication and 
coding. At any rate, the system is meant to give indicators rather than exact an-
swers and the user is supposed to find the more precise answers by using his own 
knowledge, other experts and perhaps other data sources. 
 Twelve graphs are drawn, each of them followed by an interpretation of 
what the graph may tell the user. The twelve graphs illustrate:  
 
1. The accumulated number of repairs  
2. The accumulated number of repair hours 
3. The mean unavailability due to repairs (not included here) 
4. The accumulated number of repairs for each pump  
5. The accumulated number of repair hours for each pump  
The total number of failures (functional; non-functional; and early) 
7. The number of repairs due to time between repairs. 
8. Subsurvival functions  (observation modes) 
9. Conditional subsurvival function (observation modes ) 
10. Subsurvival functions  (failure modes) 
11. Conditional subsurvival function (failure modes) 
12. Time average failure rate bound 
 
 
 
 The first graph shows the accumulated number of repairs for all pumps. 
This graph tells the user if there is an increasing or a decreasing tendency in the 
number of failures over the years of operation. The graph does not depart mark-
edly from a straight line, meaning that on average for the three pumps, nearly the 
same amount of failures happen every year. 
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That the number of failures per year is fairly constant is not the same as to say 
that no ageing effects occur. This is illustrated by the next graph, the accumulated 
number of repair hours over the operating years.  
 
 
 
 
(The graph of a related quantity, the mean unavailability due to repair, no. 3 in 
the above list, is not shown here). 
If there are ageing effects, they should cause the number of repair hours to in-
crease, that is, the repair hours curve should generally tend to curve upwards 
(convex curve). However there is no clear indication of this in the graph. It shows 
that there has been certain periods with unusually many repair hours. After 1988 
the curve flattens out but then it starts to increase faster again, even if only 
slightly, from about 1993. 
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If we want, for example, to look at the individual pump and compare it with the 
average of all three, this can easily be done. 
The graph fig. shows the accumulated number of repairs for each pump. As we 
can see, there is a marked difference between P1 and the two others in the begin-
ning, however  P3  seems to have had some problems between month 150 and 
180, a 2.5 years period in 1987-1989, and that brings it closer to  P1. For the same 
reason, when looking at the entire 20 year period, the repair number for  P3  has a 
vaguely increasing tendency while  P1  and  P2  show a rather constant repair rate. 
 
 
P1
P3
P2
 
 
 
 
The graph on fig.  shows the accumulated number of repair hours for each 
pump, supplemented with average accumulated hours for all three pumps (curve # 
2 from above to the right in the diagram. Such a graph can be of some help to a 
user who wants to study the difference between pumps. For example, the diagram 
to the left showed that  P2  has increasingly many repairs in the last couple of 
years, but the diagram to the right reveals that it must have been mostly minor 
repairs. 
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The next step is to split up the investigation according to types of failures, 
such as critical and non-critical failures. We also want to look for early failures 
after repair. The drawing below (not in the 12 item list) is a simple rendering of 
how the repairs are distributed over the period. It is easy to observe the un-
wanted situations: the early failures after repair.  
 
 
 P = Preventive   C = Corrective   
 
 P C           C     P        C C             P           P
 
 
 
 
 The following two graphs illustrate, a.o., the question of early failure after 
repair.. Let us first take a look at the total number of failures. 
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The histogram on the figure shows, by the height of each bar, the total amount 
of repairs per year for all pumps. The bar is divided into repairs due to (1) non-
critical failures, (2) non-early critical failures and (3) early critical failures, that 
is, those that happened less than 3 months after the last repair on that pump. 
 As an example, consider the year 1994 in which 12 repairs were per-
formed at the pumps. Of these repairs, 9 were due to non-critical failures;  3 were 
due to critical failures;  and one of them happened less than 3 month after the last 
repair. This means that the 12-unit bar for 1994 is split up in (from below) seg-
ments of 9, 2 and 1 units, respectively. 
 In 1990 there were 7 repairs, but 5 of them were due to critical failures and 
all happened less than 3 month after the last repair. The red, green and blue seg-
ments of the 1990 bar therefore have lengths 2, 0 and 5, respectively. 
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Now, look at another graph, the one shown on the figure above . It is a histogram 
which illustrates the distribution of time between repairs: the length of the first bar 
(column) from the left indicates the number of repairs that have happened within 
0-1 months from last repair of the component; the second bar indicates the number 
of repairs within 1-2 months from last repiar; etc. Each bar consists of two, the left 
part (in red) indicating the total number of failures of the type, the right part (in 
green) the number of ‘functional’, that is, critical failures.   
 As an example, consider the bar with “9” below it; it carries the informa-
tion that 7 repairs were done on components that had been repaired last time be-
tween 9 and 10 months ago; and of those 7 repairs, 5 were due to critical failures. 
Whether early repairs are in fact re-repairs cannot be seen from the graph, but there 
are some indications of this phenomenon in that we have noted rather many re-
repairs taking place in the first 1-3 months after a repair. However less than half of 
them are due to a critical failure. 
 A drawback of a graph like the one just described is that it does not con-
tain any information about when these early failures occurred: was it in 1978? – or 
was it in 1994? Neither does the graph tell us which components it was that gave 
rise to particularly fast re-repairs. One of the graphs already described, the one 
showing the accumulated number of repairs per month, might be a good supple-
ment in this question. 
 One reason for the plant management to be interested in early failures is 
that knowledge about this aspect may help to discover bad quality of (1) the repair, 
(2) the spare parts or perhaps (3) repair instructions. 
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Conclusion 
This graphs are an illustration of using non-dynamic sources, where the user can 
determine how he can use the information and present them in a way that he gets 
an answer on his question 
 
The aim of the pilot study was not primarily to study the behaviour of the 
pumps but rather to address the question whether the failure reports can give 
valuable information to the users. 
This chapter has described some simple graphs that can be produced without 
making assumptions and without using mathematical formalism. Nearly all the 
graphs give rise to new questions; and new graphs can be produced to try to find 
the new answers. The users of the system themselves must inform the system 
about their needs. 
However at this stage of the development of the program, we may conclude 
that some information can be extracted from the reports.  
Before drawing a final conclusion of the study, it is necessary to discuss it 
with relevant staff at the Ringhals 2 plant that know the pumps, and to hear their 
opinion of the results. 
The TUD data are not perfect, but it is hoped that the output may provide at 
least some indications on ‘good or bad behaviour’ in the area. The same methods 
combined with advanced statistical methods can be used on the local data bases, 
probably leading to more reliable results. 
When the results from using the TUD data base are compared with  results from 
the local data base, the uncertainty of using the TUD data base only can be esti-
mated 
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